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“I do not know if this tiger recognized his prey.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that the process of competition generally encour-
ages companies to lower their prices, which benefits consumers.2 And yet, in
certain specific cases, antitrust rules intend to sanction predatory prices be-
cause they eliminate the competitive process itself.3 A similar situation ap-
plies to innovation. Innovation is one of the main bases for competition
between companies and it is beneficial to consumers who may enjoy new
products that are also better suited to their needs.4 But certain innovative
behaviors are considered predatory and are punished accordingly,5 despite
the fact that no legal concept specifically addresses this issue.
This absence of a legal category specifically dedicated to anticompeti-
tive practices disguised as innovation leads judges to create numerous type I
1. JEAN RACINE, ESTHER 38 (Theatre Classique 2015). This quote, dated from
1689, reminds us that predatory practices imply a prey, and that preys would be
better off if they could identify their predators.
2. Why is Competition Policy Important for Consumers?, EUR. COMM’N, http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html [https://perma.cc/QBR8-
XPUG)] (last updated Apr. 16, 2012).
3. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Prac-
tices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1975).
4. See J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,
5(4) J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 631 (2009).
5. Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1121, 1121–22 (1981).
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and II errors.6 The jurisprudence has not yet generalized the etiquette of
predatory innovation, which nevertheless answers some of the problems en-
countered by antitrust law with high tech markets development.7 The appar-
ent lack of interest in that notion by courts has led the doctrine to devote few
studies to the subject, which has accentuated judges’ reluctance to use it, and
so on.
This article seeks to substantiate the value of the notion of predatory
innovation, which covers a wide range of practices, many of which are not
reached by actual antitrust rules. The development of a dedicated legal re-
gime is a necessity which must be promptly answered.
In fact, the terms of predatory innovation—which the author defines as
the alteration of one or more technical elements of a product to limit or elimi-
nate competition—describes all practices that, under the guise of real innova-
tions, are anticompetitive strategies aimed at eliminating competition without
benefiting consumers.8 They may take two different forms—the modification
of a technological platform and the technical design of a product—which are
aimed at removing the compatibility of third party technologies with those of
a dominant firm, or at impairing competing technologies operations.9 As of
today, antitrust law provides no satisfactory answer to these strategies.
It is common to see that many practices in high tech markets are simul-
taneously occurring on several continents at once—e.g., the new version of
software is generally available at the same moment around the world.10 For
that reason, the author chooses to carry out a comparative study between the
United States and Europe, first because these two bodies of antitrust law may
learn from each other—they have homologous roots—and also because the
countries involved have some of the highest GDP in the world.11
The main objective of this article, in the first instance, is to portray the
practices that can and should be condemned as predatory innovation. This
article questions, in substance, what predatory innovation is, and exposes the
6. See id. at 1144–45, n.89.
7. See id. at 1146–48.
8. See Thibault Schrepel, Predatory Innovation: A Response to Suzanne Van Ar-
sdale & Cody Venske, JOLT DIGEST (June 10, 2017), http://jolt.law.harvard
.edu/digest/digest-note-predatory-innovation; Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation,
91 YALE L.J. 8, 22 (1981).
9. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 8, at 9.
10. See, e.g., Amit Chowdhry, iOS 11 Is Now Available: What is Included in the
Update?, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
amitchowdhry/2017/09/26/ios-11-0-1-now-available/#257f336b7295.
11. List of Countries by Projected GDP, STATISTICS TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), http://
statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php [https://perma.cc/
NU6M-CZNN].
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multiplicity of these practices and their frequency, which necessarily brings
the need to create a specific legal regime.
Most predatory innovation practices are currently dealt with under the
label of technological tying.12 The creation of some legal rules dedicated to
predatory innovation would then lead to removing this teetering legal con-
cept and lead to the creation of—instead—a more coherent legal regime—in
both continents—that could be understood by business leaders.13 Indeed, the
creation of an autonomous legal regime for predatory innovation will ensure
various benefits for those involved: not to suffer the consequences from the
legal uncertainty surrounding the notion of technological tying; not to be
subjected to differences of interpretation depending on whether the practices
are committed in Europe or in the United States; to address many practices
that cannot be caught under the legal regime of technological tying; and to
provide judges an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive analysis.14
II. THE PRACTICES OF PREDATORY INNOVATION
This article intends, in the first instance, to portray practices that can
and should be condemned as predatory innovation. This is all the more nec-
essary as these practices tend to develop exponentially.15 One of high tech
markets specificities is the ability for companies to continually improve their
products that already are on the market, creating, in fact, a multitude of op-
portunities to reduce competition.16 The system of digital updates (sometimes
automatic), for instance, allows a dominant firm to impose a predatory strat-
egy to its users, depriving them of any possibility of rejecting the product’s
new version in the short term.17 A company can thus create as many preda-
12. See generally Charles M. Gastle & Susan Boughs, Microsoft III and the Metes
and Bounds of Software Design and Technological Tying Doctrine, 6 VA. J.L.




15. See, e.g., Suzanne Van Arsdale & Cody Venzke, Predatory Innovation in
Software Markets, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 243, 247 (2015).
16. See Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home
and the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749, 751 (2005)
(“Design ceases to be a one-time event and instead becomes a continuous pro-
cess. And that is true not only for the next product sold, but also for the entire
installed base. The dead hand of the past and the constraints of backwards
compatibility are lifted.”).
17. See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in The New Economy,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 707–08 (2012) (discussing the low risk that con-
sumers will reject redesigns implemented through software updates).
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tory strategies as it updates one of its products. These are, in other words,
post-innovation practices appearing once the product is put on the market.18
The newness of these strategies has been the subject of recent develop-
ments in the North American legal doctrine,19 but it remains nonexistent in
Europe20 even though the general literature seems to be willing to consider it
more and more, as illustrated by the diagram below:
FIG. 1. GRAPH GENERATED VIA GOOGLE NGRAM VIEWER21
18. For more development on this notion of “post-innovation,” as opposed to “pre-
innovation,” see Jonathan B. Baker, Evaluating Appropriability Defenses for
the Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms in Innovative Industries, 80 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 431, 438–40 (2016).
19. See Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and
Free Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 36 (2015) (underlining the possibility to
apprehend predatory innovation from a “free speech” angle). Because this no-
tion is inoperative in Europe, and because this article is focused on antitrust law
only, the author will not mention it any more.
20. Yet, predatory innovation is a nontariff strategy that can appeal to many com-
panies. See Terry Calvani, Non-Price Predation: A New Antitrust Horizon, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 410 (1985) (“Let’s take a minute and explore why an
individual or group might undertake such a course of conduct. Why might non-
price predation be an attractive strategic policy? [N]on-price predation is safer
than its cousin, price predation.”). It is a matter of recognizing that all preda-
tory practices do not imply a price strategy. Companies can also implement less
expensive eviction by using other variables. See id. at 410–11. On nontariff
predation, Susan A. Creighton, then director of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion’s Bureau of Competition, described these practices as “cheap,” stressing
that they cost little to the company that puts them into practice, and they have
no pro-competitive quality. See Susan A. Creighton, Dir., Bureau of Competi-
tion Fed. Trade Comm’n, Cheap Exclusion, Remarks Before: Charles River
Associates 9th Annual Conference, Current Topics in Antitrust Economics and
Competition Policy (Feb. 8, 2005); see also ANDREJ FATUR, EU COMPETITION
LAW AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK
INDUSTRIES 150 (2012) (“As unlikely as predation is, there are several addi-
tional reasons why network effects may make predation more likely.”).
21. “Google Ngram Viewer . . . is an online search engine that charts frequencies
of any set of comma-delimited search strings using a yearly count of n-grams
2018] Predatory Innovation 25
The fact that the author has not been able to identify any European legal
studies specifically dedicated to predatory innovation on high tech markets
reinforce the usefulness of the author’s study to the extent that the new econ-
omy involves an infinite renewal of products/product features which must be
analyzed.22 It is then necessary to identify the different classifications of
predatory innovation practices in order to determine which types of practices
can be labeled as such.
A. Examination of Different Classifications for Predatory Innovation
Different classifications have been conceived for predatory innovation
practices.23 An appropriate nomenclature makes it possible to define which
practices must be condemned and thus can be used by judges and authorities
to concentrate their efforts on practices that actually require sanctions.24
The author will examine all of the classifications which have been rec-
ognized by the European and North American doctrine. Although none of
them is sufficient, they all contribute to the creation of a new and more effi-
cient dichotomy.
1. Presentation of Existing Classifications
Part of the North American doctrine argues that innovation is predatory
when research and development (R&D) costs exceed expected gains.25 It has
been proved, however, that this theory is insufficient.26 Another part of the
found in sources printed between 1500 and 2008 . . . .” Google Ngram Viewer,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Ngram_Viewer (last updated
Sept. 19, 2017) (footnote omitted).
22. See Thibault Schrepel, From Microsoft to Google: Eyes Wide Shut on Preda-
tory Innovation?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2 (July 2017), https://www.com-
petitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Europe-Column-
July-Full1.pdf.
23. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
24. In 1982, James D. Hurwitz and William E. Kovacic stressed that the notion of
innovation was ill-defined. For reasons that the author ignores, this statement
has lost none of its veracity, more than 30 years later. See James D. Hurwitz &
William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35
VAND. L. REV. 63, 66 n.5, 117–18 (1982); see also Thomas J. Campbell, Pre-
dation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1658 n.113 (1987) (“The complete identity of these two
practices suggests that there should be many authors proposing tests for preda-
tory product innovation, since there are so many with predatory pricing tests.”).
25. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.02 (2d ed.
2010).
26. The main reason for this deficiency is that such an investment is only anticom-
petitive if competitors have to make a similar investment in order to be compet-
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North American doctrine has thus started to work on the development of
different classifications of predatory innovation practices.27 They contribute
to the creation of a better dichotomy.
a. Explicit and Implicit Classifications
i. Number 1: Type of Modification
Several authors including Ross D. Petty28 have distinguished three kinds
of predatory innovations based on the type of changes made on products. The
first type of predatory innovation encompasses all modifications designed to
eliminate a similar product; this type of predatory innovation modifies a
product in order to convince consumers that the quality of a competitor’s
products is inferior.29 The modification is expressly intended to eliminate an
identified product.30 The second type of predatory innovation covers changes
tailored to eliminate comparable products: this type of predatory innovation
implies a product modification designed to restrict or eliminate competition
by improving the original product.31 This strategy seeks to compete by en-
hancing product qualities.32 The third type of predatory innovation embraces
all modifications made on product components: this type of predatory inno-
vation aims to modify a product in a way to remove the interoperability of
competing products.33
ii. Number 2: Link Between Strategy and Technical Design
One European author has distinguished two categories of predatory in-
novation.34 The first category of technical design changes includes all modi-
fications in which the technical design of a product is affected.35 These
itive. A company’s overinvestment may simply result from the mismanagement
of its resources, without, however, having breached antitrust law. For a full
range of arguments against this theory, see id.
27. Note that several of these classifications do have some similarities. They are,
however, reproduced in their entirety in order to preserve the logic of each one.
28. See Ross D. Petty, Antitrust and Innovation: Are Product Modifications Ever
Predatory, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 997, 1023–24 (1988); see also MARIATER-
ESA MAGGIOLINO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 116–18 (Steven
D. Anderman ed., 2011).
29. See Petty, supra note 28, at 1024.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1025.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1026–27.
34. See Carlos Acuna-Quiroga, Predatory Innovation: A Step Beyond?, 15 INT’L
REV. L. COMP. & TECH. 7, 7 (2001).
35. See id. at 16.
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strategies aim at eliminating compatibility with competing products, or at
integrating an independent product into another one.36 It may be made, for
instance, by removing the compatibility of a file format with a competing
operating system.37
The second category of communication strategies includes all communi-
cation strategies by which a dominant company regularly announces the up-
coming release of a new product—with fictional features—to dissuade its
competitors from entering the market.38 The purpose of such a strategy is
generally to raise competitors’ costs or to precipitate the market exit of an
existing competing product.39 This type of predatory innovation has no direct
link with the technical modification of a product.40
iii. Number 3: Type of Tying
Another classification distinguishes three types of predatory innova-
tions, some of which are similar to the first two categorizations discussed
above.41 The first type is a change of an existing product, where a dominant
company seeks to modify its product in order to make it incompatible with
those of its competitors.42 The second type is technical ties, where a company
integrates one of its products into another one.43 This may be done, for in-
stance, when the company chooses to integrate a photo editing software pro-
gram into a much larger operating system.44 Another type is traditional ties,
where a company contractually ties a product to another one.45
iv. Number 4: Time Element
A final dichotomy distinguishes the different types of predatory innova-
tion according to a temporal criterion.46 It distinguishes between pure preda-
tory innovation and predation due to timing. Pure predatory innovation
36. See id. at 15 (“The term technological tying is used to describe alterations to
product design in order to render complementary products no longer compati-
ble or unnecessary, either by denying means to interconnect or integrating for-
mer individual products.”).
37. See id. at 21.
38. See id. at 25.
39. See Acuna-Quiroga, supra note 34, at 25.
40. See id.





46. This dichotomy can be deduced from the article written by Daniel A. Crane.
See Daniel A. Crane, Legal Rules for Predatory Innovation, CONCURRENCES:
28 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXI
involves the alteration of product’s technical components in order to restrict
competition.47 Pure predatory innovation may happen when a dominant com-
pany chooses to modify connectors for a product. The anticompetitive strat-
egy is implemented once the product is put on the market and adopted by the
dominant company’s competitors.48 Predation due to timing occurs when a
dominant company introduces a technical change without warning any other
companies selling compatible products.49 Predation due to timing also in-
cludes the untimely announcement of new products for the purpose of dis-
couraging competitors.50
b. Criticism and Utility of These Classifications
The above classification schemes suffer from defects that tend to chal-
lenge their legitimacy. The first classification of type modifications suffers
from including practices that are not predatory innovation.51 Indeed, when a
dominant firm decides to add a frivolous functionality to one of its products
in order to differentiate it from competing products, the firm may be decep-
tive but such a practice is not a matter of antitrust law.52 Specifically, without
altering any core functionality of the product, such a practice does not consti-
tute predatory innovation.53 Therefore, type modification cannot, therefore,
be granted full consideration.54
The second classification of link between strategy and technology suf-
fers from the same flaw. The so-called vaporware practices—i.e., the re-
peated announcements of a new product and/or unachievable
improvements—is a strategy that is not directly related to product technical
designs.55 The same goes for the strategy in which a dominant firm promises
a lower price than the one actually offered so as to discourage competitors
COMPETITION L.J. n.4, 4–8 (2013) (Fr.) (although the author does not explicitly
address the temporal aspect as a central element).
47. See id. at 5.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 7.
50. See id. at 8.
51. See Petty, supra note 28, at 1028 (discussing how suggested guidelines should
be used “to insure that antitrust laws condemn truly predatory product modifi-
cations but do not unduly chill legitimate ones.”).
52. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 730–32.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Acuna-Quiroga, supra note 34, at 25.
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from developing their own products.56 As a result, this classification does not
correctly identify the practices of predatory innovation.57
The third classification focuses on the concept of ties. Technical tying
does need to be re-qualified as predatory innovation, as the author will
demonstrate in this article. Traditional tying made by contract, however, is
not part of predatory innovation because product features are not affected.58
Classification based on type of ties can be useful.
The fourth classification based on time is highly constructive because it
integrates a temporal element that any analysis on predatory innovation
should consider.59 But, the author disputes the theory that the second strategy
of predatory innovation—predation due to timing—must be condemned.
Dominant companies have no legal obligation to help their competitors,
which is acknowledged in North American and European jurisprudence.60 By
requiring an innovator to communicate to the public before the introduction
of a new product,61 the incentive to innovate would necessarily be reduced.62
This classification must then help the creation of a new classification without
repeating its entirety. In short, these different classifications discussed above,
even though imperfect, are conducive to the creation of a new dichotomy
specifically designed for high tech markets, as discussed below.
2. Proposal for a New Dichotomy
An effective typology must concur to a straightforward identification of
predatory innovation practices, without encompassing others. It must also
56. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 704.
57. See id. at 705; Acuna-Quiroga, supra note 34, at 25.
58. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 25, § 12.03.
59. See Crane, Legal Rules for Predatory Innovation, supra note 46.
60. L’Autorite´ de la Concurrence [The Competition Authority], Sept. 4, 2014, n
14-D-09 (Fr.) (Nespresso ruling of the French Competition Authority) [herein-
after The Competition Authority].
61. To find support for imposing such a duty, see Mary L. Azcuenaga, Comm’r,
Panel Discussion on Technological Innovation, International Trade, and Com-
petition Policy, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 1, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/pub-
lic-statements/1997/12/panel-discussion-technological-innovation-internation
al-trade-and.
62. The French Competition Authority required Nespresso to send its competitor
technical information about its new machine eighteen weeks before the ma-
chine was marketed. The decision’s interventionism is unequaled in the Euro-
pean area, and is an illustration that antitrust authorities and judges may be
tempted to interfere in the management of companies. See The Competition
Authority, supra note 60; see also Thibault Schrepel, Nespresso S’Engage : Le
Droit de la Concurrence L’Emporte-t-Il ? Pas Vraiment!, LE CONCURRENTIAL-
ISTE (May 19, 2014) http://leconcurrentialiste.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
02/nespresso.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZFZ-HM42] (Fr.).
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make it easier for judges and companies to understand the legal outcomes of
this legal concept by suggesting economic justifications that any company
may provide in the event of a legal dispute.
The author proposes to distinguish the alteration of a product’s platform
from the modification of a product’s technical design—whether it concerns
software or hardware.63
a. The Author’s Proposal: Modification of a Platform or an
Independent Product
i. Modification of the Platform
The first type of predatory innovation concerns technological plat-
forms64 and interfaces.65 The author means the term platform66 in the sense of
a digital environment allowing the management and/or the use of application
services.67 Windows operating system, for instance, is a technological inter-
63. Software allows the execution of a specific task while platforms allow the man-
agement of a set of elements. In some rare cases, these two products can be
confused. See DAVID S. EVANS ET AL., INVISIBLE ENGINES: HOW SOFTWARE
PLATFORMS DRIVE INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES 12 (2008). It is
therefore necessary to consider which functions are the subject of predatory
practices.
64. We use platforms on a daily basis. See id. at 223–25 (studies on the subject of
the modification of platforms are very rare).
65. For the writing of platforms, see OCED POLICY ROUNDTABLES, TWO-SIDED
MARKETS, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT 20,
at 27 (2009) (“Rather than each application developer writing the code for per-
forming each task, the software platform producer incorporates code into the
platform, and thereby avoids duplication costs. The functions of that code are
made available to application developers through an application program inter-
face.”) (Fr.) [hereinafter TWO-SIDED MARKETS].
66. On the distinction between platform and application, see Bruce Abramson,
Promoting Innovation in The Software Industry: A First Principles Approach
to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 113 (2002). The
distinction suffers from alleviations, especially when the applications serve as a
“quasi-platform.” And yet, it remains absolutely crucial for any market analysis
related to high tech.
67. This is also the meaning adopted by Judge Posner, stressing that platforms have
no value in themselves. Compatible software and applications provide value.
See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,
928 (2001).
Networks are not valuable to the consumer in themselves; they are con-
duits for the services that the consumer values. This is one point at which
vertical integration enters the new economy. An operating system is a plat-
form for software applications, and so the writer of operating-system
software may decide to write software applications to ride on it, in much
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face on which many developers create compatible software, such as those
performing video or photographic processing.68
From a theoretical perspective, considering platform modifications im-
plies taking into account the two-sided nature of high tech markets—also
referred as dual markets69—which allow interconnecting at least two distinct
operators.70 Google is a prime example. On the one hand, the company offers
a “free” service to its users, and on the other, it charges advertisers for better
visibility.71 The modification of a platform implies therefore considering the
effects on both markets,72 which the doctrine rarely does adequately.73
Such markets generally involve high fixed costs and relatively low vari-
able costs.74 Author Jean Tirole underlines the failure of Coase’s theorem75
the same way that AT&T manufactured the terminal equipment attached
to its telephone lines.
There is a doctrinal debate on how to define this concept. See generally Al-
fonso Lamadrid, Regulating Platforms? A Competition Law Perspective, CHIL-
LIN’ COMPETITION (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.project-disco.org/competition/
112415-regulating-platforms-a-competition-law-perspective [https://perma.cc/
6ZLB-XSG7].
68. For instance, CyberLink PowerDirector, Corel VideoStudio, Pinnacle Studio,
Photoshop, Gimp & Lightroom.
69. TWO-SIDED MARKETS, supra note 65, at 24 (“A two-sided platform helps the
members of two distinct groups of customers to get together in a way that
generates value for these customers and that these customers could not get as
efficiently, or possibly at all, without the platform. The platform typically inter-
nalizes indirect network effects between the customer groups.”); see also
Marie-Anne Frison-Roche & Laurent Cytermann, Economy of platforms: Reg-
ulating a Dominant Model?, CONCURRENCES: COMPETITION L.J n 2-2015 (Fr.).
70. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Re-
port, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006).
71. See Dirk Auer & Nicolas Petit, Two-Sided Markets and the Challenge of Turn-
ing Economic Theory into Antitrust Policy, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 426, 426
(2015).
72. Measuring these effects requires antitrust law to take into account the fact that
goods or services are offered for free to users. See generally Michal S. Gal &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Anti-
trust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (2016).
73. Fre´de´ric Jenny, L’Application du Droit de la Concurrence aux Innovations de
Rupture aux ´Etats-Unis et dans L’Union Europe´enne in Innovation de Rupture,
Droit et Concurrence, CONCURRENCES: COMPETITION L.J. n 3-2016 (Fr.).
74. See Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay—Is
the Internet Driving Competition or Market Monopolization?, 11 INT. ECON.
POLICY 49, 55 (2014) (“In general, it can be observed that many two-
sided markets are characterized by a cost structure with a relatively high pro-
portion of fixed costs and relatively low variable costs.”).
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on the latter.76 He indicates that anticompetitive strategies are numerous inso-
far as a company can weigh some of the anticompetitive effects on one side
of the market—and not on consumers—which gives them some impunity.77
The failure of Coase’s theorem also tends to prove the multiplicity of an-
ticompetitive practices, because when one side of the market is not quite
satisfied, it may compensate for its harm by implementing such practices.
Even though no empirical study—to the best of the author’s knowledge—has
ever confirmed this postulate of the failure of Coase’s theorem on two-sided
markets, the growing number of such practices demands a closer
examination.
From a practical perspective, all strategies relating to the physical char-
acteristics of a product are necessarily excluded from this category. Con-
versely, any changes made to operating systems, web or application servers,
and finally web or software applications in the sense of multimedia libraries
(e.g., online stores) and other digital workspaces are included.78 The author
also incorporates some changes made on internet browsers which, with the
development of applications directly operable on them, can serve as a
platform.79
In short, this strategy of a dominant firm is straightforward. It aims not
at altering a competitor’s product directly, but rather at preventing access
and/or reducing the overall compatibility of a product with the rest of a plat-
75. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 70, at 649 (recalling Coase’s contribution and
concluding that “[t]he Coase theorem is a useful benchmark. In practice,
though, various factors make it unlikely that the two parties will reach an effi-
cient agreement from their perspective [where ‘efficiency’ refers to their joint
surplus, and not to social surplus].”).
76. Two authors pointed out that several definitions have been given to dual mar-
kets. One implies the exclusion of the Coase theorem by which exchanges be-
tween economic actors lead to an optimal allocation of resources when the
property right is clearly defined and when they are no transaction costs. The
other definition disregards this feature. See Dirk Auer & Nicolas Petit, Two-
Sided Markets and the Challenge of Turning Economic Theory into Antitrust
Policy, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 426 (2015).
77. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 70, at 649.
78. See Hanno F. Kaiser, Are “Closed Systems” an Antitrust Problem?, 7 COMP.
POL’Y INT’L 91, 96 (2011). For an up-to-date overview of all multimedia layers
in 2006, see EVANS ET AL., supra note 63, at 223.
79. See Michael L. Katz & William P. Rogerson, The Applications Barrier to Entry
and Its Implications for the Microsoft Remedies: Comment on Iansiti and Rich-
ards, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 723, 728 (2009). On this point, one author analyzed
that platforms develop on the basis of other platforms. See Daniel O’Connor,
Understanding Online Platform Competition: Common Misunderstandings in
Competition and Regulation of Online Platforms 7 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 9, 16
(2016) (“Netflix, for example, uses Amazon Web Services (AWS) as its cloud
infrastructure.”).
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form.80 This strategy may have two purposes: to prevent the product of a
competing firm from being fully integrated within the dominant company’s
platform, or to prevent the competing platform from interacting efficiently
with that of the dominant company.81 This strategy thus targets two types of
competition, between platforms and within a platform.82
ii. Modification of an Independent Product Technical Design
From a theoretical perspective, the second type of predatory innovation
takes place when a dominant company alters the functioning of a system
software program, an application software program, an application,83 a
driver,84 or a physical product.85 Such a strategy aims at eliminating the com-
patibility of a product, at changing the way it operates, or at adding a (per-
haps frivolous) functionality to it so as to affect competition between
contributors, which include software developers, content and service provid-
ers,86 as well as companies producing compatible hardware.87
From a practical perspective, by employing the second type of predatory
innovation, a dominant company seeks to directly affect the product of its
competitors.88 The goal can be achieved by implementing modifications on
80. See Richard S. Markovits, An Ideal Antitrust Law Regime, 64 TEX. L. REV.
251, 293 (1985) (noting that predatory innovation can, in fact, aim at creating a
period during which no compatible product is available); see also Philip J.
Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft, and Be-
yond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 287 (2009) (on the inexorable tension between
platforms and applications).
81. See id. (discussing how platform owner-applications developer relationship
gives “rise to concepts like ‘co-opetition’ and ‘network economics.’”).
82. See Kaiser, supra note 78.
83. Application, MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2002) (Applications
are used to perform a specific task).
84. Driver, MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2002) (A driver is
software that allows the use of computer hardware).
85. It may be hardware, phones, camera or any technological object.
86. See Kaiser, supra note 78; see also Robert E. Bartkus, Note, Innovation Com-
petition Beyond Telex v. IBM, 28 STAN. L. REV. 285, 296 (1976) (“A more
likely means of deterring imitation by the use of design is for a manufacturer of
both a principal product and its accessories periodically to redesign the connec-
tions, junctions, or plugs between products in order to force consumers to buy
the accessories from the innovator during the period when competitors are
redesigning their accessories to fit the altered principal product.”).
87. It can be a charger or a device that physically interacts with another.
88. The OECD notes that such strategies are intimately linked to network effects.
See TWO-SIDED MARKETS, supra note 65, at 34, (“One of the defining charac-
teristics of a two-sided platform is the existence of indirect network effects
across consumer groups. Indirect network effects between the two sides pro-
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the technical aspects of a product (e.g., by altering coding or programming)
or by modifying the external characteristic of a product (e.g., by revising an
external design or physical functionalities). A modification of the internal
and external technical characteristics may occur at the same time, for in-
stance, when a company miniaturizes its connectors.89
b. The Usefulness of the Proposed Dichotomy
i. In Terms of Available Information
The dichotomy presented in this article is constructive to the analysis of
predatory innovation because it makes it possible to differentiate two distinct
types of predatory innovation practices and thus to identify more easily dif-
ferent strategies which are linked to each type.
The distinction between platform modification and independent product
modification also makes it possible to integrate into the analysis the level of
information available at the time of implementation. The modification of a
platform, which contains multiple software programs, tends to suggest that a
dominant firm does not have a specific knowledge of all the anticompetitive
effects created on compatible products when modifying its platform. Several
millions of software programs and applications are indeed operable on the
most popular platforms.90 It is not uncommon, therefore, that changes made
on platforms have unintended consequences. Therefore, based on informa-
tion available to the company and based on a temporal element, it should be
presumed that platform modifications are anticompetitive because predicting
their anticompetitive effects is often far too complex.
ii. In Terms of Effects on Competition
The modification of a platform, which has a potential effect on a large
number of companies with developed compatible software or applications,
tends to include both pro-competitive (for some competitors) and anticompe-
titive effects (for other competitors). The more open the platform is, the
mote larger and fewer competing two-sided platforms. Platforms with more
customers of each group are more valuable to the other group. More users
make software platforms more valuable to developers, and more developers
make software platforms more valuable to users.”).
89. Connector, MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2002) (“In hardware
[a connector is] used to join cablels or to join a cable to a device.”).
90. More than 3,300,000 apps are currently available on Android. Number of An-
droid Apps, APPBRAIN (Sept. 24, 2017, 6:01 PM), https://www.appbrain.com/
stats/number-of-android-apps. More than 2,200,000 are currently available on
the Apple’s iOS. Sam Costello, How Many Apps Are in the App Store?,
LIFEWIRE (May 5, 2015), https://www.lifewire.com/how-many-apps-in-app-
store-2000252.
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greater is the presumption that the company is not aware of all compatible
products.91
Sanctioning predatory innovation practices carried out on platforms
must then require greater caution, the risk of type I errors92 being higher.93 In
other words, a platform modification is more likely not to be purely anticom-
petitive94 than an independent product alteration. It is indeed easier to modify
the technical components of an independent product in order to alter the
functioning of a specific competing product. Most interactions between
software—as well as between physical products—are easier to identify than
those resulting from a platform.
Moreover, the interplay between different software programs or physi-
cal products is actually designed by a developer who has expressly foreseen
the latter—by allowing, for instance, a physical or a digital connection via
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and other data transmission systems. It is thus easier for a
developer to alter competing products by modifying its compatibility. In
short, changes made to the technical components of a product tend to facili-
tate the implementation of a purely anticompetitive strategy which, in fact,
can be condemned without creating type I errors.
It should be noted, however, that although the anticompetitive modifica-
tion of product technical components is more likely to be characterized in
this situation than when it is made on a platform, courts must not neglect the
importance of the latter because its anticompetitive effects bear on a greater
number of third parties. In other words, the author’s interest on the subject is
to detect predatory innovation strategies rather than to give a free pass to a
particular type of predatory innovation.
The dichotomy proposed in this article is intended to allow judges to
upbuild reasoned decisions and to endow parties write clear-cut conclusions.
The dichotomy also makes it possible to clarify the debate on the issue, to
91. It should be noted here that, as for software, a platform may be “proprietary”
when its creator is the only one enjoying the right to distribute and modify it—
such as Apple and its App Store. It may be “free” when third parties can access
the source code to study or adapt it, modify and redistribute it.
92. As a reminder, type I errors, also called “false positive,” reflect the fact that a
judge or a competition authority condemns an undertaking for having imple-
mented one or more practices which, in reality, are not anticompetitive. For an
analysis of the risk of type I errors with predatory innovation, see Kevin Coates




94. On the other hand, as Stephen Elop—then CEO of Nokia—pointed out, com-
petition between companies is increasingly turning on platforms. See Chris Zie-
gler, Nokia CEO Stephen Elop Rallies Troops in Brutally Honest ‘Burning
Platform’ Memo?, ENGADGET (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.engadget.com/2011/
02/08/nokia-ceo-stephen-elop-rallies-troops-in-brutally-honest-burnin.
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provide a legal structure, and lastly, to facilitate the identification of what
practices are—or not—predatory innovation.
B. Different Implementations of Predatory Innovation
Studying practices that fall within the scope of predatory innovation re-
quires particular caution.95 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) underlines the difficulty of analyzing practices in high
tech markets,96 a trend which the author’s study confirms. While many prac-
tices seem to fall within the scope of predatory innovation, several of them
should be excluded from it. The author then analyzes the ones that should be
considered by courts or competition authorities.
1. Practices That Fall Outside the Scope of Predatory
Innovation
The design of digital platforms cannot, in itself, be considered an an-
ticompetitive strategy. The same goes for the integration of content within
platforms,97 which, although stigmatized by some as being anticompetitive,
should not be sanctioned—at least not as predatory innovation.
a. The Design of Digital Platforms
i. Different Types of Platforms
The European Commission defines platforms as products using “the In-
ternet to allow interactions between at least two distinct but interdependent
groups of users so as to create value for at least one of the groups; Certain
platforms [being] considered to be intermediary service providers.”98 A com-
pany may decide to design an open, a free, or a proprietary platform.
Platforms are said to be open in the presence of any communication,
interconnection, exchange protocol, or data format whose technical specifica-
95. TWO-SIDED MARKETS, supra note 65, at 34 (“Evaluating the impact on social
welfare of policy measures in markets where two-sided platforms operate can
be very challenging.”).
96. Id.
97. On the need not to presume the existence of an anticompetitive strategy when a
dominant firm operates on a second market, see Patrick Rey et al., The Activi-
ties of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Conse-
quences and Implications for Competition Policy, INSTITUT D’ECONOMIE
INDUSTRIELLE, UNIVERSITE DE TOULOUSE (2001) (Fr.).
98. On definition from the questionnaire on platforms launched by the European
Commission, see European Commission Press Release, Have Your Say on
Geo-Blocking and the Role of Platforms in the Online Economy, IP/15/5704
(Sept. 24, 2015) [hereinafter European Commission Press Release], http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5704_en.htm.
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tions are public and without restriction of access or implementation.99 An
open platform is not necessarily free.100 Platforms are free or open source
when a license101 guarantees users the right to access the source code,102to
study its functioning, to adapt it, to redistribute it,103 and lastly, to improve
it.104
Lastly, platforms are closed or proprietary when they carry data for
which specifications are not public and/or whose use is restricted by their
owner(s). Technical details are unknown or subject to a nondisclosure agree-
ment.105 The development of compatible software is generally hampered by
this type of platform which does not legally or technically allow one to exer-
cise—at the same time—the four software freedoms106: the execution of
99. See Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Opening Platforms: How, When and Why?,
131 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper 09-030, 2009).
100. See Chris Murray, Open Source and Open Platforms: the Questions You
Should Be Asking, OOMPH INC. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.oomphinc.com/
notes/2009/05/open-source-open-platforms/.
101. See Michal S. Gal, Viral Open Source: Competition vs. Synergy, 8 J. COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 469, 474 (2012) (“Today, commercial companies fully or
partially fund, support, and govern many social-production FOSS projects.”).
102. Similar to Facebook’s model that has a partial open source policy, see Open
Source at Facebook, FACEBOOK (Sept. 17, 2016), https://code.facebook.com/
projects/p0 (“At Facebook, we have always been strong advocates of open
software. From our earliest days—when the site was built on PHP, MySQL and
memcached—we’ve been privileged to stand on the shoulders of open source
giants. Ever since, we’ve worked hard to contribute our own work back to the
community, and help other companies—both small and large—learn from our
experience of building web, mobile, big data, and infrastructure stacks at scale.
Most of our projects are on GitHub, and we also actively contribute elsewhere,
such as to the Hadoop projects, LLVM, GNU grep, and Mercurial, amongst
many others.”).
103. See Elaine Chow, Appeals Court Dismisses Open-Source Antitrust, LAW360
(Nov. 10, 2006), https://www.law360.com/articles/13357/appeals-court-dis-
misses-open-source-antitrust-case (“GNU GPL is a free software license that
allows the recipients of a computer program to study how a program works,
modify it and redistribute copies of the modified program without
punishment.”).
104. See also EVANS ET AL., supra note 63, at 71. On the interest in companies to
develop open source technology, see Josh Lerner et al., The Dynamics of Open
Source Contributors, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 114 (2006).
105. See Lerner et al., supra note 104.
106. See Wendy Seltzer, The Imperfect Is the Enemy of the Good: Anticircumven-
tion Versus Open User Innovation, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 933 (2010)
(“[A]ll four of these components are necessary to give users full autonomy in
their software environment; to use and learn from the program and to modify it
to suit their needs. They guard against lock-in to an uncooperative vendor or
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software for any type of use, the access to its source code, the distribution of
source code copies, as well as the modification and thus the improvement of
the source code.107 It should be noted, nonetheless, that some companies
owning proprietary platforms allow access to a great deal of information in
order to help developers.108
In fact, the distinction between the three types of platforms discussed
above is not always manifest.109 Some platforms are hybrids, which create
difficulties of appreciation for competition authorities as in the case of the
European Commission in its Android investigation.110 Moreover, the expres-
sion of an open system is an oxymoron because each system, in fact, is differ-
entiated from others by the perimeter covered by its technologies.111 Three
authors have thus represented the complexity of evaluating the nature of a
platform:
defunct system, and assure that users will be able to reuse their individual in-
vestments in the program.”).
107. Id.
108. Other criteria can also be used to define an open source model. The modifica-
tion of any open source model may involve the implementation of an anticom-
petitive strategy. See Je´roˆme Gstalter, Open Standards and Competition Law:
An Overview, CONCURRENCES: COMPETITION L.J. n 1-2010, at 6–17 (Fr.).
109. This is the case for Microsoft. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTI-
TRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 51–52 (3d ed., 2016). On the support of openness by the domi-
nant companies on high tech markets, see Michael Chapin, Note, Sharing the
Interoperability Ball on the Software Patent Playground, 14 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 220, 242 (2008).
110. The European Commission is challenging Google’s operating system hybrid
nature. See European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Sends
Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating System and Applica-
tion, IP/16/1492 (Apr. 20, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
1492_en.htm (“Android is an open-source system, meaning that it can be freely
used and developed by anyone to create a modified mobile operating system (a
so-called ‘Android fork’). However, if a manufacturer wishes to preinstall
Google proprietary apps, including Google Play Store and Google Search, on
any of its devices, Google requires it to enter into an ‘Anti-Fragmentation
Agreement’ that commits it not to sell devices running on Android forks.”).
111. Kaiser, supra note 78, at 91, 93.
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF OPENNESS BY ROLE IN
PLATFORM-MEDIATED NETWORKS112
Moreover, the way in which a platform is organized is also helpful to help
characterize its nature:
TABLE 2: MODELS FOR ORGANIZING PLATFORMS113
Most of the North American doctrine on predatory innovation advocates
the pro-competitive aspect of open platforms,114 underlining that they allow a
112. Eisenmann et al., supra note 99, at 2.
113. Id. at 5.
114. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The
Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST 715, 741
(1998). Nevertheless, open platforms seem less likely to be the subject of an-
ticompetitive strategies. See Josh Baskin, Note, Competitive Regulation of Mo-
bile Software Systems: Promoting Innovation Through Reform of Antitrust and
Patent Laws, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1727, 1738 (2013); see also Seltzer, supra note
106, at 932; see also Michael J. Schallop, The IPR Paradox: Leveraging Intel-
lectual Property Rights to Encourage Interoperability in the Network Comput-
ing Age, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 195, 241 (2000) (noting the two advantages of open
source: social and utilitarian).
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greater diversity of products.115 This point of view would be hard to chal-
lenge, although different anticompetitive strategies may emerge—including
fragmentation116—that can be used for anticompetitive purposes.117 The doc-
trine is more divided to evaluate whether closed systems are pro- or anticom-
petitive by nature.118
In a distinguished article, Hanno F. Kaiser has raised many competitive
advantages created by closed platforms.119 The Kaiser article, which goes
against part of the doctrine, features arguments which deserve to be
considered.
First, closed platform may, for instance, allow the pro-competitive limi-
tation of the number of users.120 A company may indeed have an interest in
limiting the presence of users on its platform.121 For instance, social networks
may want to limit the number of enrollees based on the population targeted,
and a restaurant may want to control the number of its customers. The same
logic applies to platforms which may want to limit the number of applica-
tions and software programs to reduce search costs associated with identify-
ing the best ones.122 In addition, paying for a poor-quality software program
115. See Jonathan Rosenberg, The Meaning of Open, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Dec.
21, 2009), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/meaning-of-open.html (“At
Google we believe that open systems win. They lead to more innovation, value,
freedom of choice for consumers, and a vibrant, profitable, and competitive
ecosystem for business.”).
116. The term “fragmentation” refers to the fact that open source software is modi-
fied by an operator so that several versions of the software, potentially incom-
patible with each other, are in circulation. On the existence of anticompetitive
strategies on open source systems, see Gal, supra note 101, at 485. More gener-
ally, a company may want to help develop an open source system on a market
A in order to deprive its competitors of monopoly profits so as to better com-
pete with them in a market B.
117. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Orga-
nizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1963 (2002) (Predatory innovation strategies
may take place on open platform and a dominant company may fragment a
competing open source software in order to make it less efficient, for the bene-
fit of its proprietary software.)
118. See Kaiser, supra note 78, at 93; see generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FU-
TURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008); Tim Wu, How Apple’s
Closed Ways Could Land It Into Antitrust Trouble, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 20,
2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/11/20/apple-antitrust/.
119. See Kaiser, supra note 78, at 102.
120. Id. at 99–100.
121. See Florence The´pot, Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking:
A Matter of Two-Sided Markets, 36 WORLD COMPETITION 195, 200 (2013).
122. See Nikos Smyrnaios & Franck Rebillard, Entre Coope´ration et Concurrence:
Les Relations Entre Infome´diaires et Editeurs de Contenus d’Actualite´, CON-
CURRENCES: COMPETITION L.J. n 3-2011, at 14 (Fr.).
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may discourage the purchase of another software program on the same
platform.123
Yet, the European Commission argued for an opposite view back in
2010 during the Microsoft and Yahoo merger, pointing out that in order to be
successful, “a search engine needed to attract the most users on both sides of
the platform.”124 The idea of network effects, which are central to technologi-
cal tying issues, stems from the idea that companies necessarily want to at-
tract the greatest number of users.125 But the point deserves at least to be
discussed in each individual case.126 A company operating in high tech mar-
kets, even in search engines, may not want to attract an infinite number of
users on both sides of the platform.127
Second, closed platforms may allow ensuring their safety.128 Limiting
competition within a platform—so-called “intra-platform” competition—
may indeed be justified for security reasons.129 The Android’s mobile plat-
form, known to be more open than Apple’s, was the first to suffer a viral
attack in March 2011.130 Google then admitted the presence of fifty-eight
123. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Analysis of Rules and Standards for
Software Platforms, 10 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 2, 74 (2014) (“The classic story
involves the collapse of the Atari game console business in the early 1980s.
Atari used a game cartridge that was an open standard making it possible for
third parties to write games. Consumers could not observe the quality of a
game until they played it. The availability of reviews was much more limited
than it is today. A flood of low-quality games appeared and contributed to the
rapid decline of this pioneering game company. The successful game console
companies such as Sony (for its PlayStation) that followed Atari limited the
ability of third parties to publish games for their platforms and imposed quality
controls.”).
124. Eur. Comm’n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! EUR-Lex
32010M5727, ¶ 48 (Feb. 18, 2010) (“[I]n order to be successful, a search en-
gine operator will try to attract as many participants on both sides of the plat-
form as possible.”).
125. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Compe-
tition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
126. For instance, some companies may want to provide a service that saves con-
sumer various “research costs” by sorting upstream information. In such a case,
increasing the number of users and available information is not an objective
pursued. On the contrary, it is a matter of providing quality information by
allowing access to only certain users. See Smyrnaios & Rebillard, supra note
122; Kaiser, supra note 78.
127. See Smyrnaios & Rebillard, supra note 122 and accompanying text.
128. See Kaiser, supra note 78, at 91.
129. The safety objective by itself does not appear to be part of antitrust law objec-
tives. This is, however, a matter for day-to-day management. See id.
130. See id.
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malicious applications on its platform.131 At that time, the Android system
simply sent Google a signal to point out which applications were vulnerable
and needed to be deleted, while Apple’s system provided an a priori security
in which each proposed application was previously subjected to a security
test before entering its online store.132 But as a matter of fact, it is difficult to
evaluate which model benefits consumers the most, both having the potential
to increase consumer welfare, schematically, by encouraging the creation of
many applications or by ensuring optimal security.133
Lastly, limiting cross-platform competition can be justified by the need
to create software programs or applications specifically designed to ensure
their efficiency within a platform.134 The simultaneous development of appli-
cations for several platforms,135 facilitated by the existence of technical in-
termediaries,136 is not necessarily beneficial to consumers in terms of how the
final product will be designed.137
In short, closed platforms should not be condemned per se,138 nor can it
be assumed that open platforms only produce pro-competitive effects.139 It is
131. Jason Kincaid, Google Responds to Android Malware, Will Fix Infected De-
vices and ‘Remote Kill’ Malicious Apps, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 5, 2011), https://
techcrunch.com/2011/03/05/android-malware-rootkit-google-response/ [https://
perma.cc/M4R7-TS4K] (“58 malicious applications were uploaded to Android
Market, and that they were downloaded onto around 260,000 devices.”).
132. See Kaiser, supra note 78, at 91.
133. See generally id.
134. The Economics of Open and Closed Systems, FRENCH COMPETITION AUTH. &




136. See Middleware, BARRON’S BUSINESS DICTIONARIES: DICTIONARY OF COM-
PUTER AND INTERNET TERMS (11th ed. 2013) (stating that technical intermedia-
tion is provided by middleware, which serves as a communication intermediary
between several applications).
137. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Ef-
fects, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93, 95 (1994); see also Joseph Farrell & Philip
J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: To-
wards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 85, 99 (2003).
138. Several authors underline that the closed nature of a network cannot be chal-
lenged, in particular, because of the presence of intellectual property rights
which confer the right to maintain it. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 109,
at § 12.03.
139. See id.
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necessary to study all practices taking place on these platforms and not to
condemn them wholesale, or even to postulate their anticompetitive effect.140
b. Content Integration Within Platforms
The integration of content—being understood as any information or
software—is generally analyzed under the legal concept of tying.141
In the Intel case,142 the company emphasized the need to distinguish
technological ties from integrating one product into another.143 The company
argued that the former was achieved through the joint sale of two distinct
products, while the latter resulted from the integration of one product.144 In
fact, the distinction between these two practices is not an easy one because
technological tying can be achieved by integrating one product into another,
for instance, by integrating an Internet browser into the source code of an
operating system.145 Regardless of this distinction, it is necessary to analyze
the pro- or anticompetitive character of strategies falling within that scope.146
140. See id.
141. See TWO-SIDED MARKETS, supra note 69, at 175. Also note the following:
Tying can be a very effective mechanism through which a dominant firm
in a related market can penetrate one side of the two-sided platform to
gain an advantage in competition for the other side. Both Rochet and
Tirole (2003) and Choi (2004), however, are tailored to analyze specific
cases of the payment card and media software industries, respectively. It
would be desirable to develop a unified and more general framework that
can encompass a variety of two-sided platform situations.
Id.
142. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5984, (Intel/McAfee) of 26 Jan. 2011,
120.
143. See id.
144. Id. Also note the following:
Lastly, according to Intel, there is an important distinction to be made
between technical tying (which is making inseparable products that can
equally function separately) and product integration (which is integrating
products to improve their global performance). According to Intel, while it
has never engaged in technological tying, it has integrated new functional-
ities into its microprocessors and chipsets, whereby bringing substantial
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i. A Pro-Competitive Foreclosure Effect
The integration147 of software programs—or application—into a plat-
form is sometimes described as being predatory.148 This type of practice, il-
lustrated by the European Microsoft case, is said to have the effect of
foreclosing competitors because dominant company enjoys an essential facil-
ity with its platform.149
Several authors150 have stressed, however, that it may be in a company’s
and consumers’ best interest to integrate a product into another because it
saves labor for the user, generates economies of scale, and allows anticipa-
tion of technical problems.151 Moreover, unlike the traditional foreclosure ef-
fect, the integration of one software program within a platform does not have
the systemic effect of eliminating competitors.152 And even if an eviction
does arise, it results ineluctably from a natural competition process by which
the company holding the platform has won the approval of its users.153
In fact, if an embedded software program has poorer performance than a
competing product, it is not established that consumers would keep the first
software program available to him—just look at how many users actually use
QuickTime on their Mac.154 Transfer costs almost never prove to be strong
enough to lock a user into an inferior technology.155 Platform owners must
147. See Jonathan Jacobson et al., Predatory Innovation: An Analysis of Allied Or-
thopedic v. Tyco in the Context of Section 2 Jurisprudence, 23 LOY. CON-
SUMER L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (noting the existence of two types of integration,
those aimed at improving the product and those aimed at locking the
consumer).
148. See Kaiser, supra note 118, at 97.
149. See Roberto Pardolesi & Andrea Renda, The European Commission’s Case
Against Microsoft: Kill Bill?, 27 WORLD COMPETITION & ECON. REV. 513,
541–44 (2004).
150. Kevin M. Murphy, Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating
Systems and Platforms, in MICROSOFT, ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMY:
SELECTED ESSAYS (2002).
151. See Rey et al., supra note 97.
152. It can be used for a subsequent increase in prices, what Jean Tirole stressed in
one of its contributions to economic literature. Such an increase cannot, how-
ever, be sanctioned under predatory innovation as it intervenes in a second
phase and on issues that are outside the definition of predatory innovation. See
id. at 21.
153. See id.
154. See After 20 Years, is QuickTime Still Relevant for the Web?, PINGDOM ROYAL
(Jan. 3, 2012), http://royal.pingdom.com/2012/01/03/after-20-years-is-quick-
time-still-relevant-for-the-web.
155. See WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTI-
TRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007).
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then be free to alter their platform, according to ownership principles.156 In
short, software integration within a platform is not—and should not be recog-
nized as—anticompetitive per se.157
ii. Illustration with the Microsoft Case
Microsoft’s decision to integrate its Windows Media Player into its op-
erating system cannot be labeled as anticompetitive per se as long as its users
are free to download competing software.158 In this case, Microsoft consum-
ers actually benefited from a multimedia software program without having to
engage any cost.159 It undoubtedly had a pro-competitive advantage, which
should have prevented the sanctioning of the practice, whether or not net-
work effects were otherwise created.160 In fact, all network effects potentially
created as a result of this practice were annihilated as soon as Microsoft users
decided to use an alternative software program.161 Condemning such a prac-
tice is similar to condemning the holder of telecom infrastructure for offering
a phone subscription service.
Vigilance, however, remains necessary. Courts must be cautious when a
company owning the platform, in addition to integrating software, also im-
plements other practices whose only effect is anticompetitive.162 In the
Microsoft example, by eradicating a feature that allows removing the internet
browser from the operating system, and by programming the system so as to
bug when certain browser-related files are deleted, the company certainly
engaged in predatory innovation.163 This case then illustrates the need to dis-
tinguish different practices that may appear as one.164
2. Practices Falling Within the Scope of Predatory Innovation
One author notes that the frequency of predatory innovation tends to be
amplified when the interests of platform owners diverge from those of con-
tent developers.165 The dichotomy the author has introduced indicates two
156. See Kaiser, supra note 78, at 105.
157. See id. at 102–03.
158. See id.; see also Toshiaki Takigawa, A Comparative Analysis of U.S., EU, and
Japanese Microsoft Cases: How to Regulate Exclusionary Conduct by a Domi-
nant Firm in a Network Industry, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 237, 245 (2005).
159. See Takigawa, supra note 158, at 259.
160. See id. at 257.
161. See id. at 245.
162. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts,
2006 UTAH L. REV. 741, 751 (2006).
163. See id. at 744.
164. See id.
165. Weiser, supra note 80.
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types of such strategies. Some involve a change of platform type, causing a
competitive harm. Others, also labeled as products redesign, imply the modi-
fication of a product in a way to remove compatibility. Again, all practices of
this kind are not to be condemned wholesale, and it is therefore required to
delimit their perimeter.
a. Changing Platform Type
Changing the type of platforms166 may create a window for implement-
ing an anticompetitive strategy.167 As a reminder, open platforms imply that
all technical specifications are publicly available, without restriction of ac-
cess or implementation.168 They also allow the development of compatible
software by third parties.169 Conversely, closed platforms let their creators
control the available content.170 The development of compatible software can
thus be prevented.171
The author then proposes to study all platforms alteration strategies
whose effects can be pro- and/or anticompetitive. In more details, the altera-
tion of a closed platform into an open platform seems a priori pro-competi-
tive,172 but the transformation of an open platform into a closed one is more
contentious, the effects of such strategies being composite.173
i. From a Closed Platform to an Open Platform
1. Antitrust Issues
A platform can be changed in two ways: from an open one to a closed
one, or vice versa. In the first case, a company may choose not to ensure any
compatibility between its operating system and software programs developed
by third parties.174 In the second one, the company may decide to open its
166. For an examination of all possible ways to open or close a platform, see gener-
ally THOMAS R. EISENMANN ET AL., OPENING PLATFORMS: HOW, WHEN AND
WHY? (Annabelle Gawer ed. 2009).
167. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 109, at “Altering Existing Interfaces”.
168. See discussion supra Part II.B.i.b.
169. See Rosenberg, supra note 115; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 114, at 741.
Nevertheless, open platforms seem less likely to be the subject of anticompeti-
tive strategies. See Baskin, supra note 114, at 1738; see also Seltzer, supra note
106, at 932; see also Schallop, supra note 114, at 241 (noting the two advan-
tages of open source: social and utilitarian).
170. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
172. Baskin, supra note 114; see also Gal, supra note 101, at 478.
173. Baskin, supra note 114.
174. The Economics of Open and Closed Systems, supra note 134, at 27.
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operating system so that third parties can offer compatible software programs
for sale.
While the European and North American doctrines seem—at the mo-
ment—to bear little significance to the anticompetitive strategies which may
be nested175 in such transformation of the platform type, real problems may
arise in terms of antitrust law.176
Professors Katz & Shapiro have stressed that opening a platform could
have the effect of harming competing platforms.177 The existence of network
effects may imply a strong competition between closed systems.178 Opening a
platform may then reduce competitive pressure on the market.179 Moving a
closed to an open platform seems, as a result, to be anticompetitive in certain
cases,180 but it is necessary to have a closer look.
2. Different Strategies
The opening of a platform may be total or partial.181 In the first case, a
company may want to set off competitive damages at several levels.182 Sup-
pose that a company, named A, decides to entirely open its platform. Also
assume that this platform was partially closed until then, meaning that com-
pany A controlled what software was available on it. Suppose further that the
platform is popular and that one of the direct effects of opening is a drastic
increase in the number of applications and software programs available on
the platform.
Several consequences should be discerned. First, network effects will be
ineluctably increased, to the detriment of competing platforms.183 Second, the
opening of the platform may have the effect of reducing the market shares of
175. Some authors even argue that an open platform cannot feature any competitive
risk. See Giovanna Massarotto, Open Source Paradigm: Beyond the Solution to
the Software Patentability Debate, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 647,
675 (2016).
176. Matt Asay, Open Source as an Antitrust Strategy, CNET.COM, http://www.cnet
.com/news/open-source-as-an-antitrust-strategy (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
177. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986) (noting that the choice to




181. EISENMANN ET AL., supra note 166, at 131–32.
182. See Gal, supra note 101, at 469, 474–75.
183. Mikołaj Czajkowski & Macieh Sobolewski, Switching Costs and Network Ef-
fects—How Much Do they Really Matter in Mobile Telecommunications? (U.
of Warsaw, Working Paper No. 29/2013 (114), 2013).
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a competing company, called B, which is selling compatible software.184
Company B may suddenly face increased competition on its core market,
forcing it to reduce its selling price.185 If B is also selling a competing operat-
ing system, the opening of the platform may then create a foreclosure ef-
fect186 beneficial to A on its core market.
Meanwhile, in such a situation, consumer welfare will nevertheless be
increased. The programming of more software—to the detriment of B—is a
salutary competitive process that should not be condemned. Some of the ef-
fects created by this practice are thus pro-competitive, which is typically true
when a company entirely opens its platforms because the company is chang-
ing its business model for the benefit of certain consumers. As a result, the
total opening of a platform should not be considered as a violation of anti-
trust law.
The case of a platform partial opening may be more problematic. Imag-
ine that a dominant company chooses to move from a closed platform—in
which it controls the content—to a semi-open platform—in which it reserves
the right to accept third-party content, or to reject it. One understands here
that the dominant company may want to accept the software/applications of
small companies—in order to increase the overall utility of its platform—and
to refuse the software/applications of bigger companies that may compete
with it in other markets. Consequently, if the dominant company designs its
platform to create technical incompatibility with the products of strong com-
petitors for unjustified reasons, the partial opening of the platform may have
an anticompetitive effect which should be condemned under the label of
predatory innovation.
ii. From an Open Platform to a Closed Platform
A company owning an open platform may decide to shift it into a closed
system, whether it is for pro-competitive reasons or to lock the market.187
The probability that anticompetitive effects will be created is, in fact, more
serious than when the opposite change is made.188 Judges must then assess
whether such a change is justified by an economic reason—other than the
anticompetitive effects to eliminate competition.189
184. EISENMANN ET AL., supra note 166, at 131.
185. Id.
186. See Gal, supra note 101, at 485–86 (describing a variant of this strategy).
187. The Economics of Open and Closed Systems, supra note 134, at 20; see also
Baskin supra note 114.
188. The Economics of Open and Closed Systems, supra note 134, at 21–24.
189. Id.
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1. Pro- and Anticompetitive Reasons Explaining Such a Change
A recent joint report of the French Competition Authority and the Com-
petition and Markets Authority lays out six reasons why a company might
want to close its platform.190 The first reason is to protect its core business. A
company operating in the market of software may use its experience as a
springboard to ultimately compete with a dominant firm in the market of
platforms.191The second reason is that the owner of a platform may want to
lock one of its faces in order to strengthen a dominant position on the
other.192 For instance, a company may want to close down its users’ faces “by
preventing them from transferring their data to another platform in order to
increase its market power on the sellers” side.193 Also, a wrapping strategy
may aim at reinforcing the company’s presence on as many sides as possible
in order to encourage its users to use them all.194
The report states that the third reason is that the company may wish to
close its platform in order to reduce competition on the market of compatible
products.195 The goal here is to eliminate competition from products that can
be used independently of the system.196 The fourth reason is that, to the ex-
tent that the price on the platform is regulated and remains below the one
maximizing the profits of the dominant firm while the price of components is
not, the latter may want to close the components market in order to realize
additional profits.197The fifth reason is that software and application develop-
ers may ask for a license at the most competitive price from a platform
owner, which may result in monopoly profits loss.198 Closing the platform
may resolve this problem.199
The sixth and last reason is price discrimination. The owner of a plat-
form may wish to practice on its users depending on how they use its plat-
form.200 A closed system is indeed required to impose a higher price on the
users who are using its platform the most.201 These various anticompetitive
reasons tend to explain why a platform owner might want to close its plat-










200. The Economics of Open and Closed Systems, supra note 134, at 25.
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form.202 In these different cases, the company would be implementing a prac-
tice of predatory innovation and should be sanctioned accordingly.
But the transition from an open platform to a closed platform may also
cause heavy losses to the company implementing it. Suppose that a company,
named APL, decides to close its mobile operating system, called iOC, to all
third parties. All mobile applications developed by third parties would in fact
become incompatible with the iOC. It goes without saying that it would be
impossible for this company to recreate millions of application users availa-
ble on its platform before it was closed. In this case, mending an open plat-
form into a closed one would cause enormous damages that the company
could certainly not offset over the long run. It is then essential for judges to
take into consideration all reasons that may lead a company to make such a
change, for instance, by considering that if a company takes the risk of doing
so, a valid economic reason may justify it. Such reasons are in fact numer-
ous. They can lie, for instance, in the need to increase security, or to allow a
more fluid use of the platform, or even to control the content in order to
avoid negative externalities.203
2. The Effects of Such Mutation
Moving from an open to a closed platform can affect all software and
applications operable on it, but it can also affect other platforms.204 There are,
in fact, different ways for a company to close its platform, which create dif-
ferent effects.205
In the first hypothesis, a dominant firm may affect compatible software
and applications by intentionally seeking, by technical means, to forbid its
competitors from accessing it.206 But the platform closure may also result
from the regular introduction of a product’s new versions creating indirect
incompatibility with competing products.207 The report of the French Compe-
tition Authority and the Competition & Markets Authority finally underlines
the possibility that the incompatibility may result from contractual arrange-
202. EISENMANN ET AL., supra note 166, at Abstract (“At the platform provider and
sponsor levels, these decisions entail: 1) interoperating with established rival
platforms; 2) licensing additional platform providers; or 3) broadening sponsor-
ship. With respect to end users and complementors, decisions to open or close a
mature platform involve: 1) backward compatibility with prior platform gener-
ations; 2) securing exclusive rights to certain complements; or 3) absorbing
complements into the core platform.”).
203. The Economics of Open and Closed Systems, supra note 134, at 27.
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ments.208 It is the case when purchasing a mobile phone on which no plan can
be concluded with third parties.209
In the second hypothesis, closing the platform may affect other plat-
forms whenever users of the third party’s platform can no longer interact
with those of the dominant company.210 The removal of a competing plat-
form’s portability may also cause anticompetitive damages.211 The closing of
the platform can finally result from incompatibility with other platform
components.212
Several examples corroborate how numerous are the ways to close a
platform. Among the major cases dealing with predatory innovation is the
IBM case in which a company had decided to change the type of interface
between its computers and hard disks.213 Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak
and C.R. Bard v. M3 Systems also exposes a similar strategy.214 It should be
noted, however, that to the best of the author’s knowledge, no European case
falls under this type of predatory innovation. And yet, some recent examples
illustrate that such strategies are increasingly common, which proves that
antitrust law suffers from not having the necessary tools.
In 2010, Google blocked the automatic export of user data to another
website, unless the information can flow back and forth. The company ac-
cused Facebook of not allowing data export,215 the reason why, apparently, it
had decided to remove the portability in retaliation.216
In 2012, Twitter limited the ability for its users to use multiple applica-
tions running on Twitter at the same time.217 As a reminder, these applica-
tions allowed the inclusion of additional features to the service proposed by
208. Id.
209. The Economics of Open and Closed Systems, supra note 134, at 27.
210. Id. at 21–24.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 13.
213. See Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979) (rejecting claims that IBM had violated antitrust law by changing the
interfaces between its computers and external tape and disk drives).
214. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Ber-
key Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
215. Alexei Oreskovic, Google Bars Data from Facebook as Rivalry Heats Up,
REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/05/us-google-
facebook-idUSTRE6A455420101105.
216. The term portability refers to the fact that data can be transferred from one
website to another.
217. Ryan Lawler, Twitter Gives Devs 6 Months to Display Tweets Properly, Use
New Authentication and Rate Limits, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 16, 2012), http://
techcrunch.com/2012/08/16/twitter-gives-developers-6-months-to-properly-dis
play-tweet-use-new-authentication-and-rate-limts/.
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Twitter.218 They can be activated for an unlimited period. It may happen, as a
result, that the limitation of these applications number was aimed at prevent-
ing these apps that could become essential and compete with the initial func-
tionalities proposed by Twitter.219
In 2012, Facebook prevented its users from sharing their Instagram
photos—which it had just acquired—on Twitter.220 As a reminder, Instagram
is a social network allowing the sharing of photographs. Once a photo is
published, the user can choose to share it on other social networks that are
not specialized in photographs sharing.221 It seems that the rivalry between
Twitter and Facebook in this market has led the latter to prevent the photos
published on Instagram from being shared on Twitter.222
In 2013, Facebook prevented all iPhone game developers from using
virtual currencies other than its own.223
In 2016, Instagram blocked an application called Being which allowed
its content to be read without having to use Instagram.224 Instagram intended
to prevent its users from accessing its service through a third-party applica-
tion that would allow accessing its content for obvious reasons linked to ad-
vertising revenues.225
Each of these practices meets the criteria of predatory innovation. Nev-
ertheless, a case-by-case analysis would have been necessary in order to as-
sess whether or not a technical justification was provided, and thus, whether
the company should have been convicted or not. Irrespective of the verdict
that each of these cases may have received, it shows that many practices
meet the criteria for predatory innovation.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Leena Rao, Instagram Photos Will No Longer Appear in Twitter Streams at All,
TECHCRUNCH, https://techcrunch.com/2012/12/09/it-appears-that-instagram-
photos-arent-showing-up-in-twitter-streams-at-all (last visited Dec. 9, 2012)
(“Last week, Facebook-owned Instagram decided to turn off support for Twit-
ter Card functionality for its photos. Basically, you would no longer see the full
images; rather, you’d see a cropped version.”).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Ron Knox, Facebook Fires Back at Monopoly Accuser, GLOBAL COMPTETION
REV. (Oct. 21, 2013), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1058126/
facebook-fires-back-at-monopoly-accuser.
224. Sarah Perez, Instagram Kills Newly Launched ‘Being’ App, Which Saw 50K
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b. Product Modification to (Partially) Remove Compatibilities
i. Specificities Associated with This Type of Predatory
Innovation
Product interoperability is often described as the ability to exchange in-
formation and to use this information.226
The modification of software or application can fulfill similar objectives
to those exposed to the change of platform type. Amending product inter-
operability may affect a competitor in the same market. This would be the
case if PCs were suddenly incompatible with Macs or a competitor in a
downstream market—for instance, when audio speakers are suddenly incom-
patible with Macs.
There is, however, a specific characteristic of this type of predatory in-
novation: the potential changes in the product are less a matter of an overall
philosophy than it is for the choice of an open or proprietary platform.227
Many companies justify their choice to offer an open platform because this
encourages sharing and a free world in which the concept of computer own-
ership is forsaken for the benefit of the community which is free to develop
various software programs or applications.228 Such motivation is much less
common regarding software development insofar as they are not intended to
allow other applications to operate on it.
On the contrary, such a modification aims at changing a product’s func-
tioning so that its interaction with other products is improved, or deteriorated
in the case of a strictly anticompetitive practice. The possible economic justi-
fication for this type of predatory innovation is related to short-term
efficiency.229
This type of predatory innovation also involves cheaper and faster
changes than for mutations in the platform type. Removing wireless technol-
ogy from an electronic device may result, for instance, from the elimination
of a single line of computer code, unlike the change of platform type that
requires entirely new global settings.230 In other words, this type of practice
implies a lower cost than altering a platform, which tends to escalate its
implementations.
226. See Interoperability, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interoperability
[https://perma.cc/RW2C-KR6J] (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
227. Id.
228. See Open and Closed Systems in Social Science, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipe
dia.org/wiki/Open_and_closed_systems_in_social_science (last visited Sept. 4,
2018).
229. See Interoperability, supra note 226.
230. Id.
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ii. The Various Concretizations of Such Strategy
Such a predatory innovation may aim at removing a product function. It
could be, for instance, when files generated by one product cannot be exe-
cuted on another product.
Predatory innovation can also result from changing the functionality of
a product. For instance, a phone manufacturer may decide to change the
wireless communication mode of its devices, from Bluetooth to Wi-Fi. The
wireless communication functionality is maintained, but the latter is modified
so that the compatibility with a competitor product is eliminated. As a result,
wireless speakers using Bluetooth technology will be incompatible for the
benefit of a dominant company, which will be able to increase the sales of its
own Wi-Fi speakers.
Such a strategy of predatory innovation can finally result from adding a
frivolous function to a product. A company may decide to allow its users to
execute an abandoned programming language. It can, as a result, require all
compatible products to allow the execution of that language, because some
compatible software may then require its use. In such a situation, compatibil-
ity with competing products could be eliminated on the grounds that they do
not allow the execution of an additional programming language which is
obsolete.
These different strategies of removing, changing or adding functionali-
ties have recent manifestations. The Intel231 and iPod iTunes Litigation232
cases are two examples illustrating the antitrust issue of removing direct in-
teroperability with competitor products.233 And many other examples also
testify the regular occurrence of such practices.234
Predatory innovation practices, besides the fact that they are numerous,
may also take many forms that this study profiles into two main categories.
The utility of the author’s dichotomy is intended to allow the identification of
these practices whose forms evolve along with technological evolution. To
seek listing every single one of them would be unsuccessful, the reason why
it is of particular importance to have the tools for identifying them when
necessary.
231. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT IN THE MATTER OF INTEL CORPORATION,
FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009).
232. Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 05-CV-0037 YGR, 2014 WL 4809288, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014).
233. Some less well-known cases concern the same issues in which the dispute was
defined as such. See In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Anti-
trust Litigation, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1361 (J.P.M.L. 2014); see also Arminak &
Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
234. See New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 96 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d,
373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Apple, 2014 WL 4809288, at *1.
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The damages caused by many practices on the economy must lead anti-
trust law specialists to develop a legal regime that addresses predatory inno-
vation. The need to recognize a specific regime for these practices seems to
be indisputable insofar as current antitrust rules do not make it possible to
apprehend these practices without creating judicial errors. The implementa-
tion of a specific regime will thus increase firms’ legal certainty while giving
judges the ability to impose clear-cut decisions. As a consequence, such a
regime does not lead to more sanctions, but on the contrary, it leads to better
sanctions. It will strengthen “free markets”—by allowing companies to com-
pete on nonfrivolous innovations—which is the only driving force not im-
peding with innovation in opposition to interventionism.
III. THE NEED FOR AN AUTONOMOUS LEGAL REGIME
FOR PREDATORY INNOVATION
Legal categories are tools that reflect the objectives assigned to antitrust
law,235 the reason why legal qualification given to predatory innovation is
essential.
Numerous legal decisions, from the United States and Europe, appre-
hend predatory innovation practices using the legal rules of tying.236 More
precisely, the concept of technological tying is often used to analyze certain
practices of predatory innovation. Yet, these two notions must be separated
from one another. The need to create a coherent legal regime implies the
creation of some legal rules dedicated to predatory innovation. It would
eventually imply to remove the teetering concept of technological tying so as
235. Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on
Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft
Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 486 (2009) (“Antitrust categories are not just
analytical tools. They also reflect the objectives and underlying premises of the
entire competition law system.”); see also Charles M. Gastle & Susan Boughs,
Microsoft III and the Metes and Bounds of Software Design and Technological
Tying Doctrine, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 n.113 (2001) (noting that, on the issue
of which objectives to assign antitrust law, some authors argue that it should
pursue economic efficiency, it is called consumer welfare, while some others,
defending total welfare, assign the protection of many more parameters, such
as employment); OLIVIER FR ´EGET, LA CONCURRENCE, UNE ID ´EE TOUJOURS
NEUVE EN EUROPE ET EN FRANCE 14–15 (Odile Jacob ed. 2016) (arguing that
antitrust law has a social purpose, not an economic one; talking about
“economism” to denounce the fact that economic theories take an increasingly
important place in antitrust law to the detriment of legal concepts); Daniel A.
Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1228
(2016), (“[A]ntitrust law is generally ill positioned to describe how the pie is
allocated or to prescribe how it should be allocated[.]”).
236. Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, 1 COMPETITION POL. INT’L
1, 2 (2005).
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to create, instead, a more coherent legal regime that could be understood by
business leaders without creating type I or II errors.237
In short, the author intends to answer two questions: Is technological
tying recognized by courts as being independent from general tying? The
author demonstrates the great deal of ambiguity surrounding this issue.238 But
then, even by supposing that a legal regime should be created for technologi-
cal tying, will it be good enough to address entirely the question of predatory
innovation? The answer the author gives is straightforward: no, it is not.239
A. Similarity and Disparity Between Predatory Innovation and
Technological Tying
Professor Bosco has underlined how difficult it is to redefine the legal
framework, asking, “is there ever a real change for legal concepts?” and ad-
ding, “will they be tomorrow fundamentally different from what they are
today? The author has reasons to believe they will never be really new nor
truly remodeled to the point of showing a new face.”240And yet, it is essential
to reconsider several of them, including technological tying. The author will
then recall its perimeter in order to identify its similarities with the notion of
predatory innovation.
1. The Legal Regime of (Technological) Tying
In both the United States and Europe, the concept of tying has been the
subject of extensive case law.241 The same statement cannot be made regard-
ing the concept of technological tying—also said technical tying.
a. The General Rules of Tying
i. Its Mechanism
Tying practices consist of offering two distinct products (the tying and
the tied products) in one batch.242 Ties may result from the specific character-
237. As a reminder, type I errors, also called “false positive,” reflect the fact that a
judge or a competition authority condemns an undertaking for having imple-
mented one or more practices which, in reality, are not anticompetitive. Con-
versely, type II errors, also called “false negative,” reflect the fact that a judge
or a competition authority decides not to condemn a company which has imple-
mented one or more practices which are in fact anticompetitive.
238. Tirole, supra note 236, at 3.
239. Id.
240. David Bosco, Regards sur la Modernisation de L’Abus de Position Dominante,
LES PETITES AFFICHES (Fr.), n 133, July 2008, at 14.
241. See Google Ngram Viewer, supra note 21 (indicating that tying is the trendiest
of Article 102 TFEU and Section 2 Sherman Act anticompetitive categories).
242. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 89 (“[M]aking the conclusion of
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istics of the product (a pair of shoes is usually sold with laces), a contractual
bond (the obligation to contract an insurance when buying a car), or an inte-
grated design (as may be the integration of an internet browser within an
operating system).243
While it is widely acknowledged that ties are usually pro-competitive,244
courts have stressed over the years that tying may also produce anticompeti-
tive effects.245 In fact, North American judges were the first to use a four-step
test to determine whether a tie should be condemned or not.246 They
analyzed:
(1) the existence of a dominant position in the tying product market;
(2) the existence of a separate product for which exists an autonomous
demand;
(3) the impossibility of buying one of two products without buying the
other;
(4) the existence of competition distortion in the tied product market.247
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obliga-
tions which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connec-
tion with the subject of such contracts.”).
243. J. Gregory Sidak, Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers?, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 619, 623 (2015).
244. See Sarita Frattaroli, Note, Dodging the Bullet Again: Microsoft III’s Reformu-
lation of the Foremost Technological Tying Doctrine, 90 B.U.L. REV. 1909,
1913 (2010); see also Richard J. Gilbert & Michael H. Riordan, Product Im-
provement and Technological Tying in a Winner-Take-All Market 4 (Oct. 13,
2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/discussionpapers/
h17/index.files/CPDP-17-E.pdf (noting that tying can also harm the company
which is implementing it by removing its ability to exploit the benefit of a
superior compatible product).
245. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality
of Invention, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 16 n.82 (2012) (intra-brand ties are
one of the last practices condemned in theory under a per se rule, although the
legal regime applied by the courts is actually more complex); see also Kaiser,
supra note 78, at 95 n.38; see also Tirole, supra note 236; see also R. Preston
McAfee et al., Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation
of Values, 104 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372 (1989) (on the interest companies have to
implement anticompetitive strategies); see also Stefan Stremersch & Gerard J.
Tellis, Strategic Bundling of Products and Prices: A New Synthesis for Market-
ing, 66 J. MARKETING 55, 57 (2002) (indicating that the anticompetitive interest
of these practices is reinforced by studies on consumer behavior when con-
fronted to pure tying practices).
246. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
247. Id.
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This four-step test, as defined by North American jurisprudence, frames the
notion of tying which cannot be used to appreciate practices outside of its
own scope.248
European courts apply the same test but they add a fifth independent
criterion: the lack of objective justification.249 The guidance on its enforce-
ment priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now 102 TFEU)
admits the possibility of proving any efficiency gains,250 even when the first
four criteria failed.
ii. Evaluation in North American and European Antitrust Law
In the United Stated, allegations of ties251 are generally dealt with under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act,252 but several cases illustrate the possibility of
using Section 2 of the Sherman Act.253 It should be underlined, however, that
ties are then subjected to a distinct regime from the one of monopolization.254
In Europe, the concept of tying is subjected to different rules255 from the
ones applied to other predatory practices—which Jean Tirole criticizes256—
although both ties and predation practices are generally addressed under Arti-
248. Eirik Østerud, Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings
Under EU Competition Law: The Spectrum of Tests, in 45 INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION LAW SERIES 141 (Alastair Sutton ed. 2010).
249. See Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm’n Eur. Cmtys., 1991 E.C.R. 11-1439, at
96; see also Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Int’l v. Comm’n Eur. Cmtys., 1994
E.C.R. 11-755, at 136.
250. Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s En-
forcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclu-
sionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 1 [hereinafter
Guidance on Comm’n Enforcement Priorities].
251. See id. at 7.
252. See id. at 6.
253. See Kate Wallace, The Wonderful World of Tying, A.B.A. 101 PRAC. SERIES
(2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_
101_201_practice_series/the_wonderful_world_of_tying.html. In fact, several
texts could be invoked, as noticed by Wallace in her article entitled. See id.
254. See Maria Lilla` Montagnani, Predatory and Exclusionary Innovation: Which
Legal Standard for Software Integration in the Context of the Competition ver-
sus Intellectual Property Rights Clash?, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COM-
PETITION L. 304, 325 (2006) (A regime distinct from monopolization is not the
case in Europe.).
255. See European Commission Press Release, supra note 98, at 8 (distinguishing
several types of monopolization: exclusive agreements, tied and bundled sales,
refusal of supply, and margin compression).
256. See Tirole, supra note 236, at 3 (defending the idea that the distinction between
tying and predation is unjustified).
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cle 102 TFEU.257 European judges have condemned indirect ties in Hoff-
mann-Laroche for the first time.258 It also results from several cases,
including Hilti and Tetra Pak II,259 where the evaluation of tying practices is
subjected to the rule of reason,260 even though they are condemned by ob-
ject261 and without evaluating their effects. In short, the rules of general tying
are straightforward and result from years of jurisprudence. Such is not the
case for technological tying.
b. Technological Tying: Different from General Tying?
i. Its Mechanism
Technological tying involves the simultaneous purchase of two prod-
ucts262 forced by technical design, or, in other words, the modification of a
product so that another one will be tied to it.263
257. See Montagnani supra note 254, at 310; see also Comm’n Regulation 330/2010
of April 20, 2010, on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and
Concerted Practices, 2010 O.J. (L 102/1) (guidance on the enforcement priori-
ties in applying Article 82 EC to foreclosure practices by dominant undertak-
ings also deal with the issue of tying; however, it should be noted that ties may
also be addressed under Article 101 of the TFEU).
258. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R 461.
259. See Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm’n Eur. Cmtys., 1991 E.C.R. 11-1439, at
96 (cited in the Microsoft case before European courts); Case T-83/91, Tetra
Pak Int’l v. Comm’n Eur. Cmtys., 1994 E.C.R. 11-755, at 136 (same). But see
Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and
Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 365, 368 (2015) (few decisions
condemning this practice are available) (“[T]he European Commission has is-
sued few decisions concerning tying. Best known is its 2004 finding that
Microsoft abused its dominant position in the PC OS market by tying Windows
with Windows Media Player (WMP).”); see also Pablo Iba´n˜ez Colomo, Beyond
the ‘More Economics-Based Approach’: A Legal Perspective on Article 102
TFEU Case Law, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 4, 12 (2016).
260. See Bosco, supra note 240, at 11.
261. See Colomo, supra note 259, at 12.
262. See Yanos Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing,
Profits, and Efficiency, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1613, 1614 (1999) (as may be the case,
for instance, when a company decides to change the connections of its devices
in order to force the consumer to buy its product, such as the charger, the video
cable).
263. See Frattaroli, supra note 244, at 1916 (“Technological tying is a functional
form of tying where a firm designs a product so that it functions only when
used with a complementary product.”).
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This type of strategy occurs when a dominant company designs a prod-
uct in a way to force its consumer to buy another product.264 This can be
done by refusing to set up means for interconnection or by integrating prod-
ucts into one.265 It may also happen when the external design of a product
creates incompatibility with competing products, for instance, when a domi-
nant firm modifies its software to force its consumers to purchase its
software.266
ii. The Need to Define a Separate Legal Regime for General
Tying
In the United States, the concept of technological tying was used in
various proceedings against Microsoft.267 Part of the doctrine argued that the
regime for general tie could have been applied to technological matters, thus
denying the need to create a separate regime for technological ties.268 An-
other part of the doctrine, supported by several courts including the one deal-
ing with these cases, argued for the necessity to apply a distinct regime for
these two types of ties.269
264. See Gastle & Boughs, supra note 235, at 25.
265. Acuna-Quiroga, supra note 34, at 15 (“The term technological tying is used to
describe alterations to product design in order to render complementary prod-
ucts no longer compatible or unnecessary, either by denying means to intercon-
nect or integrating former individual products. As a result of these variations a
firm may leverage its dominance in one market to the market for complemen-
tary products or to the new market created for the new, integrated product.”).
266. See Gastle & Boughs, supra note 235, at 25.
267. United States v. Microsoft Corp, 147 F.3d 935, 946 (D.D.C. 1998); Caldera
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1297 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1999);
United States v. Microsoft Corp, CIV. A. 98-1232 TPJ, 1999 WL 1419040, at
*1 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1999); United States v. Microsoft Corp, 87 F.2d 30, 35
(D.D.C. 2000).
268. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Mo-
nopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 447 (2009).
269. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1327
(5th Cir. 1976); see also David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Eco-
nomic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, 2
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1, 37 (2002) (noting that the Jefferson Parish held
that a per se test should be applied: “[i]t is far too late in the history of our
antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrange-
ments pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unrea-
sonable ‘per se.’” (quoting Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2, 9 (1984)). The author notes that the first judgment in the Microsoft case
applied the Jefferson Parish test, however, this test was subsequently dismissed
by the D.C. Circuit. See David A. Heiner, Assessing Tying Claims in the Con-
text of Software Integration: A Suggested Framework for Applying the Rule of
Reason Analysis, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 143 (2005).
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In Europe, the treaties270 and jurisprudence do not address this issue,271
which tends to confirm the absence of an independent regime for technologi-
cal tying.272 The European Commission only makes a reference to it in its
guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC
Treaty (now 102 TFEU), stressing the following: “The risk of anticompeti-
tive foreclosure is expected to be greater where the dominant undertaking
makes its tying or bundling strategy a lasting one, for example through tech-
nical tying which is costly to reverse. Technical tying also reduces the oppor-
tunities for resale of individual components.”273
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the Microsoft case in the General
Court of the European Union is the only one expressly referring to the term
technological tying274 which was put forward by the company.275 One analyst
also noted that this case gave an opportunity for the European Commission to
distinguish between traditional ties and technological ones.276 By acknowl-
edging the possibility for users to download other media players via the in-
ternet, the Commission indeed emphasized the need to analyze practical
effects on competition rather than to recognize illegality by object as it does
for general ties.277
Microsoft challenged this analysis on the ground that the Commission
didn’t prove the anticompetitive nature of its practice.278 Its arguments were
rejected by the General Court without further clarification, leaving doubt as
270. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, Sept. 05, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 89.
271. See Damien Gerard, The Effects-Based Approach Under Article 101 TFEU and
Its Paradoxes: Modernisation at War With Itself, in TEN YEARS OF EFFECTS-
BASED APPROACH IN EU COMPETITION LAW (Jacques Bourgeois & Denis
Waelbroeck eds. 2012). Microsoft argued that acknowledging technological
ties prevented the application of the classic rules in terms of refusal to sell,
evoking Joined Cases C-241 and C-242/91P. RTE and ITP v. Comm’n, 1995
E.C.R. 1-743; see also Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, 2004
E.C.R. 1-5039; Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 5 C.M.L.R. 11
(2007).
272. See Christopher D. David & James F. Ponsoldt, A Comparison Between U.S.
and E.U. Antitrust Treatment of Tying Claims Against Microsoft: When Should
the Bundling of Computer Software be Permitted?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
448, 451 (2007); see also Pardolesi & Renda, supra note 149, at 514.
273. See Guidance on Comm’n Enforcement Priorities, supra note 250, at 53.
274. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 5 C.M.L.R. 11 (2007).
275. It should also be noted that the European Commission refers to the term of
“technical tie.” See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5984 (Intel/McAfee),
slip op. ¶ 221 (Jan. 26, 2011).
276. See Østerud, supra note 248.
277. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 5 C.M.L.R. 11.
278. Id.
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to the existence of a truly separate legal regime for technological ties.279 Be-
cause the guidance of 2009 did not enshrine this distinction, its existence is
doubtful.
In fact, legal uncertainty appears to have been deliberately maintained
around the need to recognize a separate regime for technological tying. But
the aim of the author’s study is not to determine whether such a regime
should be acknowledged, because it would not, in any case, give the courts
and antitrust authorities the opportunity to apprehend the whole range of
practices, as the author will demonstrate.
2. Apparent Similarities Between Technological Ties and
Predatory Innovation
The concepts of predatory innovation and technological tying some-
times involve similar mechanisms which may explain why the label of tech-
nological ties actually ousted the one of predatory innovation.280 Some
authors have asked for these two notions to be addressed under the same
legal regime, which should not be done.
a. The Visible Similarity of the Two Mechanisms
i. Sanctioning Internal Practices
Legal frameworks for the two practices, technological tying and preda-
tory innovation, intend to punish a company when it implements internal
practices which aim at restricting competition.281 In general, antitrust law is
more stringent with restrictive practices directly imposed on third parties.282
The notions of technological ties and predatory innovation thus complement
the legal arsenal available to judges and authorities in this field.283
ii. Two Strategies That Can Be Confused
Literature and jurisprudence clearly distinguish predation strategies
from ties.284 However, it is worth noting these two infringements have a com-
279. Renato Nazzini, Google and the (Ever-Stretching) Boundaries of Article 102
TFUE, 6 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 301, 313 (2015).
280. See Bosco, supra note 240, at 11.
281. Dennis W. Carlton, The Relevance for Antitrust Policy of Theoretical and Em-
pirical Advances in Industrial Organization, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 47, 53
(2003).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 87.
284. See Tirole, supra note 236, at 19.
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mon nature. An author also underlines that most cases generally involve si-
multaneously some predation, ties, price discrimination and discounting.285
The concepts of technological ties and predatory innovation may cover
identical practices insofar as they may induce the purchase of two distinct
products,286 the reason why judges sometimes have difficulties distinguishing
the two practices. In the Nespresso case, for instance, the French Competi-
tion Authority characterized the practices as being illegal tying because the
company created incompatibility with competing capsules.287 And yet, the
legal uncertainty created by the legal regime of tying—in addition to being
imprecise—does not permit the strategy technical nature to be taken into
account, which could have been circumvented by applying the legal regime
of predatory innovation.
b. The Plea for a Single Legal Regime
i. Defending a Single Legal Regime
Part of the doctrine in the United States argued that ties and predatory
practices should be analyzed under the same legal regime on the basis that
analyzing predatory innovation in itself would be too complex.288 This partial
renunciation is unlikely to improve antitrust law over the long run. What is
well conceived is clearly said and the absence of distinction between these
two notions would generate lots of confusion,289 which would lead to ineffec-
tive rulings.290
ii. The Concept of Technological Tying is a Charade
Some jurisdictions have recognized the need to distinguish between the
two concepts.291 Moreover, as pointed out by part of the North American
285. Kara E. Harchuck, Note, Microsoft IV: The Dangers to Innovation Posed by
the Irresponsible Application of a Rule of Reason Analysis to Product Design
Claims, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 395, 414 (2002).
286. Id. at 398.
287. Thibault Schrepel, Nespresso S’Engage : Le Droit de la Concurrence
L’Emporte-t-Il ? Pas Vraiment !, REVUE CONCURRENTIALISTE, May 2014, at 2,
http://leconcurrentialiste.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nespresso.pdf (Fr.)
(stressing that it is not certain that regulating products interoperability encour-
ages companies to invest on the long term, contrary to what was put forward by
the French Competition Authority in its Nespresso decision).
288. Harchuck, supra note 285, at 399.
289. Such confusion was apparent in United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II),
147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See id. at 409.
290. See id. at 437.
291. Id. at 409.
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doctrine,292 the risk of type I errors293 is higher for predatory innovation than
it is for tying. It is then appropriate to assign it a proper legal regime so to
prevent such legal errors occurrence.294
Meanwhile, the concept of tying is used as a charade. Professors Waller
and Sag have stressed the following:
[T]he court tortured existing tying doctrine to carve out a new rule
of reason test for software tying in order to not second guess what
are separate and new products being unlawfully tied together by a
dominant firm and what are new features of existing products that
would serve the needs of consumers and promote innovation.295
The legal regime for predatory innovation requires addressing these issues.
This means that the concept of tying should not be used as a magical trick to
hide the inadequate analysis in the field.
Technological tying and predatory innovation have some similar roots,
which have led some scholars to argue that the first one should take over
predatory innovation. But even assuming that a truly distinct legal regime
does exist for technological tying, the fact of the matter is that predatory
innovation is broader and generally more complex. An independent legal re-
gime should then be created instead of relying on the one for technological
tying.
B. The Absolute Necessity to Acknowledge an Independent Legal
Regime
The concept of technological tying is unsuitable to address every preda-
tory innovation practices. Predatory innovation must thus be acknowledged
as an autonomous legal concept.
292. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 88 (2008) (“The Department agrees
with courts and panelists urging restraint in the area of product design and
believes that great caution should be exercised before condemning a technolog-
ical tie under the antitrust laws. Firms make many decisions about the design of
their products, the vast majority of which—including those made by monopo-
lists—raise no competitive concern.”).
293. As a reminder, type I errors, also called “false positive,” reflect the fact that a
judge or a competition authority condemns an undertaking for having imple-
mented one or more practices which, in reality, are not anticompetitive. For an
analysis of the risk type I error with predatory innovation.
294. COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF
THE SHERMAN ACT, supra note 292, at 87; see Ronald W. Davis, The Antitrust
Divisions Report on Section 2: Firm Foundation for Enforcement or a Bridge
to Nowhere?, 23 ANTITRUST 42, 47 (2008) (noting that the DOJ “forgot” to
mention predatory innovation in its report on Section 2).
295. Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 2223 (2015).
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1. The Impossible Applicability of the Legal Regime for
Technological Tying
The regime for technological tying is ambiguous, which has the effect
of decreasing the level of legal uncertainty. It suffers, besides, from many
shortcomings that disqualify it from assessing all predatory innovation
practices.
a. The Inaccuracy of the Legal Regime for Technological Tying
i. The Lack of Coordination between European and North
American law
The current regime for general tying is not the same in Europe and the
United States.296 Although European judges have taken over the entire four-
step test set out in North American jurisprudence, they do so by adding a
fifth step regarding the practice justification.297 The North American test, for
its part, does not seem to consider potential efficiencies that a tie is likely to
create.298 Also, as previously indicated, U.S. law distinguishes tying from
other practices of monopolization,299 which is not the case for European
rules, thus creating an increased level of complexity.
ii. The Occasional Recognition of a Separate Legal Regime for
Technological Tying
As the author has demonstrated, the recognition of a specific regime for
technological tying is not constant. North American judges, for instance,
have refused to recognize the existence of such a legal regime in several
cases on the ground that competitors remained free to create products com-
patible with products of dominant firms.300 And in any case, even when
296. See Montagnani, supra note 254, at 329–30 (“[I]n the US, maintaining the
distinction causes different standards to be used to assess predatory behaviors:
monopolization, on the one hand, and tying, on the other hand (the latter also
giving rise to wide debate on the tying being per se legal or illegal or needing a
rule of reason approach). Whereas, in the EU, the abuse offense test is common
for both contractual and technological tie-ins. This distinction, likely to lead to
different outcomes depending on the system under which a tying is assessed.”).
297. Economides & Lianos, supra note 235, at 519.
298. Montagnani, supra note 254.
299. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrate-
gies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) (on the difference between “monopoliza-
tion” and predatory practices).
300. Suzanne Van Arsdale & Cody Venzk, Predatory Innovation in Software Mar-
kets, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 243, 253 (2015).
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judges have admitted the existence of technological ties, they have not
clearly identified a legal regime.301
The fact is that dominant high tech companies often have a global strat-
egy.302 Software, for instance, is distributed in a single version across multi-
ple continents. Applying a different methodology to the same practice,
depending on where the trial is brought, may significantly decrease legal cer-
tainty. The importance of defining a stable and established methodology for
all practices must lead to the creation of an independent legal regime.
b. Deficiencies in the Legal Regime for Tying
i. A Legal Arsenal Overly Discordant
The concept of tying does not cover the same practices in Europe and
the United States.303 The subordination of one product purchase to another,
by technical or contractual measures, is sanctioned in both continents.304 But
the European conception of tying also intersects305 with what the North
American jurisprudence sanctions under the label of pure bundling, in which
several distinct products are sold together in fixed and unchangeable
proportions.306
Once again, legal certainty is necessarily reduced because of this termi-
nological confusion, which is also reflected in the regime applicable to these
different practices. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission note that “courts have sometimes analyzed bundling under the rubric
of tying,”307 but this is not typically the case.308 In Jefferson Parish, the Su-
preme Court ruled that selling identical products together—which is pure
bundling—is not anticompetitive and that tying can be condemned if they
create a foreclosure effect.309 According to this jurisprudence, the two no-
301. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 269, at 31; see also Go¨nenc¸ Gu¨rkaynak et
al., Antitrust on the Internet: A Comparative Assessment of Competition Law
Enforcement in the Internet Realm, 14 BUS. L. INT’L 51, 80 (2013) (the legal
concept of tied selling is still blurry as underlined).
302. CATHERINE PRIETO & DAVID BOSCO, DROIT EUROP ´EEN DE LA CONCURRENCE
1003 (Broche´ ed., 2013) (Fr.).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Two markets are thus affected insofar as the company seeks to create a lever-
age effect.
306. In this situation, one market is affected only.
307. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPE-
TITION 106 (2007) (“[C]ourts have sometimes analyzed bundling under the ru-
bric of tying.”).
308. Id.
309. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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tions benefit from a different legal regime,310 which is not how European law
analyzes them.
It goes without saying that this different interpretation of general tying
necessarily leads to a divergence regarding technological tying.
ii. Tying is an Incomplete Legal Arsenal
In the Microsoft IV case, the concepts of tying and predatory innovation
were mentioned simultaneously.311 Yet, in North American law, predatory
practices are a form of monopolization,312 while ties generally fall under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.313 The analysis in terms of market shares is neces-
sarily divergent.
There again, case law illustrates the incapacity to apprehend accurately
predatory innovation when applying tying rules. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act does not require an analysis of the market power, and without establish-
ing such power, it is nearly impossible to prove a company’s interest in im-
plementing predatory innovation strategies.314
2. Predatory Innovation as an Autonomous Legal Regime
The legal regime for technological tying—by supposing that a clear def-
inition of it actually exists—is inappropriate for two reasons. First, it does
not cover all the practices of predatory innovation and may thus lead to the
creation of type II errors.315 Second, even for the practices of predatory inno-
vation that it actually covers, it participates in the creation of type I errors.
Conversely, the creation of a legal regime for predatory innovation will make
it possible to assess such practices without risking judicial errors which are
particularly harmful in high tech markets.
a. The Singularity of Predatory Innovation
Clarifying the legal regime for technological tying will not resolve the
equation. As the author has said, technological ties and predatory innovation
cover some of the same practices—whenever a company is imposing the
purchase of two distinct products—but predatory innovation also covers
other practices.316 For that reason, it is essential to create an autonomous
310. The Jefferson Parish judgment refers to Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); Hyde, 466 U.S. at 13 (on the separate regime
for pure bundling).
311. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft IV), 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(en banc).
312. Harchuck, supra note 288, at 398.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 426.
315. See id. at 408.
316. Id.
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regime for the notion of predatory innovation so that all practices will be
looked from the same angle. As discussed below, four reasons corroborate
this need.
i. No Need for Two Distinct Products
Unlike tying, predatory innovation practices do not require the existence
of two distinct products.317 When assessing whether a practice constitutes a
tie, it could be incredibly difficult to determine if products A and B are truly
distinct from one another.318 And without proving that they actually are,319 no
sanction may be imposed, even if an anticompetitive practice required so.320
Two authors have also underlined that the product separability test is
more stringent in the United States than it is in Europe.321 A company may
prove in the United States that two products are more efficient when sold
together and as a result, they will be considered as being a single product.322
Such a mechanism is not allowed in Europe.323
In fact, the necessity to prove the existence of two distinct products may
lead judges not to condemn some practices that should be.324 Some anticom-
petitive practices may indeed be subject to antitrust law under predatory in-
novation while they are not under tying: these are all strategies in which a
dominant firm modifies an existing product without imposing directly the
purchase of a separate product. For instance, as the author has demonstrated,
moving from an open platform into a closed platform325—or removing func-
317. See J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 26 (2001) (arguing for the need to demonstrate the existence of two
distinct products should be abandoned, considering the task too difficult and
too far removed from the central issue of the damage to the consumer).
318. See id.
319. See Tirole, supra note 236, at 8 (on the difficulty to determine what two dis-
tinct products are).
320. Jon Polenberg, Comment, tfosorciM and croMiftos: Why High-Technology An-
titrust Inquiry Is Backwards and Inside-Out, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1275, 1293
(2003).
321. See Timothy Cowen & Stephen Dnes, Antitrust in the EU Digital Markets: A
Case Study, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (July 17, 2016), https://www.competi-
tionpolicyinternational.com/antitrust-in-the-eu-digital-markets-a-case-study.
322. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II), 147 F.3d 935, 958 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
323. See Cowen & Dnes, supra note 321.
324. Frattaroli, supra note 244, at 1920.
325. A closed platform implies that its creator maintains a more or less absolute
control over the content which is available. He can control which software is
distributed and compatible with its platform.
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tionality from a product—raises issues that tying actually ignores.326 The
dominant firm’s goal may be to eliminate a competitor on market B for com-
patible products without offering any alternative, so as to reduce the competi-
tor’s profits and thus the competitive pressure it may exercise on market A.
Moreover, the concept of technological tying is unfit to cover all of the
predatory innovation practices in which, for technical reasons, two distinct
products have become one. This is a de facto incoherence of technological
ties.
ii. Assessing the Anticompetitive Effects in Related Markets
A practice can be condemned under the legal regime of technological
tying only if it creates an anticompetitive effect on the tying product market
(market A), or the market of the tied product (market B).327 Three authors
have noted that tying strategies generally aim at strengthening the monopoly
power of a dominant firm in market A, which is where its core activity is
focused.328
Yet, deleting the compatibility between two products may have no
meaningful anticompetitive effect in these two markets. It is the case when,
despite the compatibility removal, some other competing products are availa-
ble to the consumer which welfare is maintained at the same level.329 The
anticompetitive effect may then occur in another market—market C, an issue
which tying cannot address.
Assume that the dominant firm on market A actually intends to create
an anticompetitive effect by reducing a competing firm’s profits on market B
to compete with it on the market C. In fact, the legal regime of tying is too
limited to examine a practice that may aim at affecting the entire ecosystem
because it only allows analyzing the anticompetitive effects on the markets
for the tying product (market A) and the tied product (market B).330
For instance, a dominant company in the production of a mobile phone
(market A) may be willing to reduce the profits of a competing company in
the market for digital tablet (market B) so as to reduce its investing capacity
and then benefit from a competitive advantage on the market for digital
watches (market C). Only the creation of a legal regime for predatory innova-
tion will allow grasping this strategy.
326. See id.
327. See Rey et al., supra note 97, at 21.
328. See id.
329. See Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON.
194 (2002) (underlining that technological ties may also aim to extend a domi-
nant position on another market).
330. Rey et al., supra note 97.
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iii. Indifference to Monopoly Power and Leverage Effect
It is not clear, based on case law, if a tie implemented with the aim of
obtaining a competitive advantage—and not a monopoly power—on the tied
market can be sanctioned under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.331 Conversely,
practices of predatory innovation may aim at eliminating only one competi-
tor, without eliminating all of them. For instance, the interoperability of a
product can be removed with one competing product only, a practice which
would be covered by predatory innovation, unlike tying.
Also, it should be noted that the North American concept of tying sim-
ply apprehends the practices which create a leverage effect332 and concept of
ties then only authorizes to deal with the strategies implying two distinct
markets. Predatory innovation practices may create such a leverage effect,333
but it is not typically the case.334 The mechanism of tying is thus too limited
by nature, which is why judges had to contort it to be able to apply it to
practices falling under another mechanism.
iv. Conclusion on the Unworkable Adaptability of Ties
Part of the doctrine proposes to distinguish between cases involving
only one practice of technological tying and those involving another preda-
tory strategy.335 They suggest using the rule of reason for technological ties
and a per se legality rule for predation.336 While this distinction may seem
satisfactory, it does not actually address any of the issues raised about the
ineptitude of the technological tie to predatory innovation. As the author has
demonstrated, the mechanism of technological ties is unsuitable for dealing
with all of the issues created by this type of practice.337 The distinction be-
tween technological tying, on the one hand, and pure predatory innovation
331. See Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach
About Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J. COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 663, 663–64 (2012) (indicating that it might be assumed that
this legal regime follows from the influence of the Chicago school, which ad-
vocated the impossibility of using monopoly power in a market in order to
obtain another monopoly on a second market without sacrificing its profits).
332. See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 683 (2012) (using the term “leverage” to describe
the strategy by which a firm uses its dominant position in a market to gain an
advantage in other markets).
333. See id.
334. A strategy of predatory innovation may aim at eliminating competitors in one
market by removing compatibility between software.
335. Harchuck, supra note 285.
336. See id. at 437.
337. Id.
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practices, on the other hand, is not only unsatisfactory, but it may also dam-
age the economy by reducing incentives to invest.
b. An Autonomous Legal Regime Designed to Incentivize
Investments
i. The Specificities of Innovation as a Predatory Strategy
Predatory innovation could lead to three different foreclosure effects:
(1) foreclosure on the main market; (2) foreclosure on related markets; and
(3) vertical exclusion. Only the first two are generally analyzed, but vertical
exclusion is a real issue regarding predatory innovation. Integrating software
programs within a platform, for instance, is perceived by some authors as a
predatory strategy that must be condemned.338
The analysis of predatory innovation is also complex as it relies only in
part on traditional patterns of predation practices.339 The latter traditionally
implies that a dominant firm incurs initial losses in hopes of recovering them
subsequently. While predatory practices may imply a similar strategy, these
losses are far from being systematic.
In fact, a dominant firm may reduce the quality of its products without
having to bear short-term losses. It happens, for instance, when a company
creates incompatibility between its product and a new technology that is yet
little used, although very promising.340 The traditional mechanism of preda-
tion is reversed as short-term losses will rarely occur,341 contrary to long-
term ones which could appear if there is a decrease in sales.342
Predatory innovation also responds to different patterns from those gen-
erally found for most predatory practices. Several authors have stressed that
all predatory strategies aim at increasing rivals’ costs, or, in other words, to
allow the dominant firm to sell its goods at a lower price than one of its
competitors.343 This is not necessarily the case for predatory innovation that
338. Id.
339. See Terry Calvani & Neil W. Averitt, Non-Price Predation: An Introduction,
16(2) J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 683, 685 (1986) (“A second great
advantage of non-price predation is that it creates fewer legal risks. Its anticom-
petitive goal may be harder to detect and prove.”). Predatory innovation is
therefore more difficult to detect than predation based on pricing.
340. In this example, the consumer may not suffer from a direct harm if a product
becomes incompatible with a new technology that is not very popular yet. Nev-
ertheless, the utility of the product is not increased. It may be necessary to wait
until the new technology allowing data transfer is popularized so that sales of
the incompatible product may actually start to decline.
341. See Tirole, supra note 236 (on the challenge imposed by predatory strategies
that incur low costs in the short term).
342. Id.
343. Calvani & Averitt, supra note 339; see Pierre F. de Ravel d’Esclapon, Non-
Price Predation and the Improper Use of U.S. Unfair Trade Laws, 56 ANTI-
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can aim at purely and simply foreclose them. Predatory innovation thus de-
serves a legal regime tailored over these different specificities.
ii. Predatory Innovation: A More Effective Legal Arsenal
When a company is implementing ties, its aim is to derive a direct bene-
fit from the practice, which the legal regime of tying can address. But the fact
that it may also eliminate competition on the long run is not truly taken into
account when analyzing the anticompetitive nature of this kind of practice.
To the contrary, analyzing predatory innovation includes considering the fact
that a dominant company precisely aims to modify its products in order to
reduce the competitive pressure. Therefore, analyzing reasons that led the
company to adopt such a practice is a fundamental element that allows the
company to be condemned.
In fact, tying disregards the idea of innovation. Yet, ignoring the an-
ticompetitive nature of an alleged innovation deprives judges of the initial
step necessary to apprehend the strategy. A dominant company may aim at
eliminating competition under the guise of improving its product, thus prov-
ing the development of a more elaborate strategy than a simple tying. A
judge must thus determine what constitutes a true or a frivolous innova-
tion.344 The importance of this distinction requires, once again, a legal regime
be fully adopted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal regime for general tying is helpful to analyze contractual ar-
rangements. It does not cover the practices of predatory innovation which
imply to consider a technical element. On the contrary, the concept of tech-
nological ties must be abandoned for a new and coherent legal regime
adapted to the practices it intends to sanction. In fact, only the creation of an
independent legal regime for predatory innovation will ensure there are no
consequences from legal uncertainty surrounding the notion of technological
ties and to apprehend many practices that cannot be reached under the legal
regime of technological ties. An independent legal regime will also grant
judges the opportunity to complete a comprehensive analysis of the practices
that are today wrongfully analyzed under technological tying and create a
legal regime that will avoid legal errors, thereby benefiting innovation.
As illustrated in the article, predatory innovation practices are numer-
ous, protean, and ever-changing. Only the creation of a dedicated legal re-
gime will enable to address these practices which are threatening innovation
as a whole. Working on which legal regime should be applied to predatory
TRUST L.J. 543, 543–45 (1987) (making the mistake of assimilating non-tariff
predatory practices with those aimed at increasing its competitor costs).
344. See Koren W. Wong-Ervin et al., Product Hopping and the Limits of Antitrust
the Danger of Micromanaging Innovation, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 2 (Dec.
2015) (identifying sham innovations).
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innovation is a necessity, but it implies, in the first instance, to recognize the
need to deal with it—the purpose of this article. Now is the time to convince
courts and competition authorities to recognize the notion of predatory inno-
vation. Tomorrow will be the time to work on the specificities of such a
regime, which will also consider North American and European antitrust
laws.
